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Abstract
This thesis presents the results of my doctoral studies at Middlesex Uni-
versity London. It contains different papers related to Labour Markets and
presents some results on production, delegation and dishonest behaviour.
The first study compares how group size interacts with both constrained and
un-constrained resource environments, finding that resource limitations di-
minish production over time and that all the groups learn with experience.
The second explores the effects of incentives in dishonest behaviour in both
the gain and loss domain finding that contrary to theoretical predictions,
subjects do not cheat more when they are facing a loss. The third, studies
the distributions derived from different delegation scenarios. We find that the
distributions derived from optional delegation are more egalitarian than the
ones made under compulsory delegation. Finally, I study gender differences
in delegation finding that gender biases only arise in compulsory delegation,
and not under endogenous delegation, and at an agent level.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis presents the results of my doctoral studies at Middlesex Uni-
versity London. The title of the thesis is “Essays on Delegation and Social
Norms” and contains four papers. All the studies are related to Labour
Markets and present some results in production, delegation and dishonest
behaviour.
In chapter 2 ,“Size and Resources Limitations within Teams” a joint
work with Marie Wong, I study how the joint effect of labour and resources
limitations affect productivity over time in a classroom experiment.
Team production has been extensively studied in the experimental lit-
erature. This literature mainly focuses on factors not related to team size or
resources scarcity (i.e. gender, identity, incentives...). There are some studies
where they vary team size and see its effect1, however, none of this previ-
ous literature studies how resources limitations affect team production over
time. Understanding how these factors work together would be beneficial to
achieve more efficiency in organizations.
For this purpose I run a classroom experiment at Middlesex University
London using 314 freshmen doing different Business School degrees. Subjects
had to produce paper aeroplanes (a la Bergstrom and Miller, 1999) in groups
1One experimental example is Brewer and Kramer (1986). They vary team size from
7 to 31 members to see its effect in cooperation. They observe that long run cooperation
in larger groups is more complicated.
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with 1 to 5 participants.2 The task was performed in five rounds of three
minutes each.3 Immediately after each round the final output was calculated
in front of all the class and the mistakes pointed out to group members so
that there was the possibility to learn from round to round. Subjects had to
follow very specific instructions in order to build as many paper aeroplanes
as possible. Any deviation from the instructions would render the final prod-
uct as being unfit. Since the model aeroplane given to the participants had
marker lines, we provide subjects with markers. These markers represented
the capital or amount of resources of each group as the use of other markers
was forbidden. The number of markers varies across groups, some groups
received the same number of markers as players (e.g. 5 players and 5 mark-
ers) while others received fewer markers than players (e.g. 5 players and 1
marker). We refer to this latter case as being resource constrained. Note,
our interest is to compare how group size interacts with both constrained
and un-constrained resource environments. Further we compared how the
different sizes of resources scarcity affect production.
We find that resource limitations diminish production over time and that
all the groups learn with experience. However highly constrained groups (e.g.
5 players and 1 marker) never overcome the coordination problem derived
from their constraint. They are the ones producing less output per capita
over time. By contrast, groups with small resources limitations (e.g. 5 play-
ers and 4 markers) are able to overcome their constraint through experience
and coordination. These groups reach the same production levels as uncon-
strained groups. In addition, we use entropy (Shannon, 1948; Masisi et al.,
2008) to measures the degree of diversity of the system4 and find that higher
entropy is achieved for least resource constrained groups. This confirms that
highly constrained groups do not achieve their maximal output potential over
time.
We therefore conclude that substituting capital with labour is only possi-
ble through experience and when the difference between labour and resource
2Participants were randomly sorted into different groups according to a predetermined
protocol.
3A non-recorded training period of four minutes was done before starting the official
rounds. This ensured that students knew how to perform the task.
4In our case the degree of diversity could be measured using their abilities, or skills, at
producing aeroplanes and how they evolve between rounds 1 and 5.
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constraint is small.
The third chapter, “Cheating and Money Manipulation” is joint work
with Gary Charness, Celia Blanco and Ismael Rodriguez-Lara. In this chap-
ter we study the effects of incentives in dishonest behaviour in both the gain
and loss domain when subjects reveal a piece of private information. Reveal-
ing this (truthful) information does not cause externalities as it only varies
subjects own payoffs. We also study the difference in behaviour under dif-
ferent type of incentives when subjects manipulate their own earnings or do
not manipulate them.
Cheating behavior may have noteworthy economic consequences. Take,
for example, the Madoff’s case, the accounting fraud in Lehman Brothers, or
the recent emission scandal at Volkswagen. The tax and customs authority
in the UK (HM Revenue & Customs) estimates that nearly half of the tax
gap (i.e., the difference between tax collected and what it ought to be col-
lected) is due to under-declaration of income.
This chapter is related to the theory of incentives which rests on the
idea that monetary incentives can be used to alter individual behavior. In
addition, the research question is closely related to studies finding that loss
contracts (i.e. up-front bonuses that workers can lose) increase workplace
productivity. One example of this can be found in Fryer et al. (2012), where
students whose teachers received a bonus at the end of the year performed
worse than students whose teachers were paid in advance (and need to return
some or all the bonus if their students did not meet the performance targets).
The authors argue that upfront incentives can be used to trigger teachers’
loss aversion and improve students’ performance as a result. Arguably, their
study is not designated to detect teachers’ cheating behavior. Our design
provides a clean environment to test cheating behavior under loss aversion,
when the results of cheating do not refer to performance or affect any third
party.
We use a variant of the design developed by Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-
Heusi (2013) where the task consist in rolling a ten sided dice and reporting
its outcome. The dice rolling is done in private and we cannot observe if a
particular individual cheats. However statistical tests on the aggregate data
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show the extent to which the experimental population distorts the truth.
We have three treatments. In the Baseline treatment subjects receive a
fixed amount for reporting a number. This treatment studies if subject do
not lie in the absence of incentives to do so. We then proceed to examine
behavior in the loss and the gain domains. Subjects are given their earnings
in a closed envelope at the end of the session. We have two variations upon
the baseline, the gain and the loss treatments. In the gain treatment, the
reported number obtained from the toss of a die, determines the amount to
be placed (by the experimenter) into the envelope, while in the loss treat-
ment all envelopes contain the maximum possible earnings and an amount
dependent on the reported number is subtracted. Using the predictions of
Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) loss aversion would pre-
dict more cheating with the loss framing, since giving up money would seem
to be more unpleasant than simply not receiving money.5 Having observed
these results, we also implemented two treatments where the participants
were able to physically manipulate their earnings by taking their earnings
from an envelope (gain treatment) or putting money into an envelope after
having received the maximum possible payoff at the beginning of the session
(loss treatment). We expected less cheating in both money manipulation
treatments as trusting subjects with the maximum potential payoff could
increases the moral cost of cheating.
We find that in most cases the presence of incentives increase cheat-
ing behaviour. In the standard treatments where participants simply receive
their payoffs in an envelope, we do not find evidence of more cheating with
a loss frame than in the gain treatment. This is surprising since we were
expecting more cheating in the loss scenario. This may be due to the fact
that the sense of ownership over the endowment obtained in advance (loss
treatment) might have been too weak in this design. We then implemented
treatments in which the participants either took their earnings from an en-
velope (gain treatment) or put money into an envelope after having received
the maximum possible payoff at the beginning of the session (loss treatment).
Indeed, requiring the participants to engage in money manipulation led to
5Cameron and Miller (2009) and Groulleau et al. (2016) also found evidence of loss
aversion rendering more dishonesty in a real effort task where subjects could lie about
their performance.
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less cheating specially in the loss treatment. In fact, there is no significant
difference between behavior in the baseline treatment and in the loss treat-
ment with money manipulation.
Our results are quite surprising and we interpret them as arising due
to differences in beliefs and moral costs across treatments. Subjects in the
money-manipulation loss treatment were more likely to feel that they had
been trusted with the full potential payoff in the beginning and had different
beliefs about the beliefs of the experimenter than people in the correspond-
ing gain treatment. The different moral costs and beliefs are likely to be
an important determinant in deciding whether (and by how much) to cheat.
Also, note that the decision to return money in the loss frame could be seen
as warm-glow giving (Andreoni, 1989, 1990).
In chapter four, “Distributional Consequences of Endogenous and Com-
pulsory Delegation”, joint with Praveen Kujal we study the effect of endoge-
nous and exogenous delegation in a hierarchical structure.
Assigning responsibilities to other people is necessary to carry out ac-
tivities in big organizations. Delegation has two main implications. First,
it allows the appointed agent to acquire new skills, expand their knowledge
and competence. This mechanism could be crucial in shaping the hierarchi-
cal structure of the firm as the successful agent selected today will be the
future manager. Second, it includes another decision which makes difficult
to know who is ultimately responsible for the decision originating the final
outcome.
Hamman et al. (2010) investigate how subjects behave when delegation
is compulsorily introduced in a hierarchical structure where agents come from
a competitive market. The principal has to delegate to an agent how to di-
vide an endowment of £10 between the principal and the recipient. They find
that allocation decisions are less fair under compulsory delegation relative to
when there is no delegation option (standard dictator game). Principals se-
lect the agent that redistributes lower amounts to recipients (and more to
principals) more often.6
6Hamman et al. (2010) also carry out some rounds of endogenous delegation. However
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The experiment had 3 treatments. In the first treatment, a standard
dictator game (Forsythe et al. 1994) where a principal divides £10 between
himself an unknown recipient. In the second treatment, principals chooses
between delegating to an agent or taking the decision themselves. In the
third treatment we replicate the main results from Hamman et al. (2010).7
We find that under compulsory delegation distributions of principals and
recipients are more different than in a standard dictator game (Hamman et
al. 2010; Bottino et al. 2016). However, this is not the case when delega-
tion is optional. That is, when principals can decide between delegating the
decision to an agent or deciding themselves more egalitarian distributions
occur. Moreover, optional delegation gives similar allocation outcomes, rela-
tive to compulsory delegation, as those observed in a dictator game. Agents
behaviour change from compulsory to endogenous delegation as they redis-
tribute higher amounts when delegation is optional. We run an additional
endogenous delegation treatment where agents did not know that principals
could decide not to delegate (informationally closer to compulsory delegation)
and find no differences in results with the standard endogenous delegation
treatment. Informational asymmetries could not explain differences in agents
behaviour.
We partly reconcile our results using social distance (Hoffman et al.
1996) and responsibility (Charness, 2000). In this framework increasing so-
cial distance, between principal and recipient, lowers the amount allocated
in a standard dictator game and diminishes the feeling of responsibility over
the unfair outcome. In our experiment compulsory delegation imposes the
highest social distance as the responsibility of the decision is forcibly passed
on to the agent. This resulting in redistributing lower amounts. Meanwhile
under endogenous delegation, the distance is chosen by the principal who
can decide to delegate or not. As a consequence of a lower social distance,
the average amounts redistributed to recipients are higher than in compul-
sory delegation. Still, this theories fail at explaining differences in agents
this rounds are only four and preceded by eight compulsory delegation rounds.
7The dictator game with agent environment has also been used to study the effect
of agents or principals being punished by their actions (Coffman, 2011; Bartling and
Fischbacher, 2012; Oexl and Grossman, 2013).
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behaviour.
We know from previous literature that male and females have different
risk, social and competition preferences (see Croson and Gneezy, 2003, for a
review). Moreover, there is evidence of a gender gap in labour markets where
females reach top level positions less often than males (Gregory-Smith et al.
2014; De Paola et al. 2016) and earn less than their male counterparts even
when doing the same type of work (Booth et al. 2003; Kulich et al. 2011).
One potential gender bias generator in labour markets could be delegation
as it shapes the hierarchy of organizations. In chapter five we study if male
and female principals behave similarly when they can delegate. Further, do
male and female agents make the same allocation decisions when delegation
is compulsory and optional? Chapter five tries to answer these two questions.
This chapter, “Gender biases in Endogenous and Compulsory Delegation”,
is joint with Praveen Kujal.
The only paper studying the link between gender and delegation is Bot-
tino et al. (2016). They use the dictator game with delegation (Hamman et
al. 2010) finding that under compulsory delegation male and female princi-
pals behave similarly and appoint the agent who gives less to recipients. This
results in both male and female principals delegating more to male agents
over time. Our aim is to see if these differences still arise when delegation is
optional.8
The results indicate that there are no gender bias in principals behaviour.
However, gender differences arise between agents. In compulsory delegation
male agents are selected more often by both male and female principals due
to them redistributing lower amounts to recipients. In endogenous delegation
this tendency disappears and female agents are selected slightly more often
than males. The main result is that agents in endogenous delegation stop
competing by redistributing lower amounts resulting in no gender differences
in agent selection compared to compulsory delegation.
8There were two agents per session, one male and one female.
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To sum up, gender biases occur at the agent level and only when delega-
tion is compulsory. Male agents redistribute lower amounts to recipients and
as a result are selected more often by principals. This is not the case when
delegation is endogenous where agents allocate higher amounts to recipients
and gender biases in agent selection is not observed.
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Chapter 2
Size and Resources Limitations
within Teams
Abstract
The impact of team composition, group size and rewards on productivity
has been extensively examined in management, economics and the psychol-
ogy literature. Yet little has been done to unravel the link between resources
limitations, group size, productivity and work experience at the same time.
We ran an experiment on aeroplane building (a la Bergstrom and Miller,
1999) with freshmen. In each session groups were randomly formed. The
number of group members gives us the labour endowment while each group
is also randomly assigned a certain amount of capital. We find that resource
limitations diminish production over time. The greater is the disparity be-
tween group size and resource availability, more adverse is the effect on per
capita output, especially when groups are larger. We also observe that what-
ever their limitation may be groups improve with experience. However, ex-
perience by itself is not enough to overcome the coordination problem that
resource constrained groups face.
Introduction
How team size and resources constraint impact team production is es-
sential for achieving efficiency in any organization. It is equally important to
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understand how teams operate under varying resource constraints and how
efficiency evolves as groups become more experienced in the task. If groups
converge in efficiency with repeat experimentation, or whether resource con-
strained groups’ per-capita output deteriorates is an important question for
any organization. We find that when resources are scarce productivity dimin-
ishes, moreover the greater the difference between team size and resources
limitation the lower the production. However experience always helps to im-
prove production, especially when there is no resources limitation. When
resources constraint is mild, learning could help to overcome the problem
and to produce similarly as when resources are not constraint.
In this paper we use a between subjects design to study the following.
Firstly, given resource constraints, we study how varying team size impacts
team performance over time. Secondly, we study how changing the degree of
resource constraints for a given group (size) impacts its performance. Fur-
ther, if resources limitations are present then do smaller teams cope with
them better than larger ones? Finally, we also study how team experience
in the task makes any difference in terms of productivity irrespective of the
size of the team. That is, is the negative effect of greater size dominated by
learning when the resources are constrained?
This paper provides a bi-dimensional experimental setting to explore the
effect of resources limitations on the group size heterogeneity problem. In
our experiment subjects have to build paper aeroplanes (a la Bergstrom and
Miller, 1999) in groups of different sizes (L= 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5). Subjects have
to follow very specific instructions for aeroplane construction. Any deviation
from the instructions would render the final product as being unfit. Since
the model aeroplane given to the participants had marker lines, we provide
subjects with markers, i.e. capital (K =1, 2, 3, 4 and 5). Subjects can only
use these markers to draw the lines. Any completed aeroplane without the
marker lines is deemed unfinished. However, the number of markers varies
across groups. Some groups receive the same number of markers as play-
ers (L=K ) while others receive fewer markers than players (L>K ). We refer
to this latter case as being resource constrained. Note, our interest is to
compare how group size interacts with both constrained (L>K ), where R=
(L-K) =1, 2, 3 and 4 and un-constrained (R=0) resource environments.
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Overall, we find that the size of the resources limitations has a nega-
tive impact on the production per capita of the group. Groups with small
resources limitations learn to coordinate and are able to minimize the effect
of resource restrictions over time. These groups end up reaching similar pro-
duction levels as those groups with no resource limitations. However, groups
with large resources limitations are unable to coordinate over time and con-
sequently their production level is always lower than that of groups with no
resources limitations.
Literature Review
A considerable body of literature has developed around team composi-
tion and production in terms of gender (Guillen and Marreiros, 2014; Invanova-
Stenzel and Ku¨bler, 2005), cooperation (Brewer and Kramer, 1986), incen-
tives (Beersma et al., 2003; Nalbaltian and Schotter; 1997), group identity
and information (Eckel and Grossman, 2005; Charness et al. 2007; Staats,
2012; Haas and Hansen, 2007) and experience (Fang, 2012; Reagans et al.
2005).
The effect of gender on team production has been analysed among oth-
ers, by Guillen and Marreiros (2014) and Invanova-Stenzel and Ku¨bler (2005).
Guillen and Marreiros (2014), study how the gender composition of pairs
affects their outcome in a non-incentivised essay writing task. Females are
found to perform equally but better than male teams. By contrast, Invanova-
Stenzel and Ku¨bler (2005) ask individuals to perform a memory game un-
der two different incentive schemes: a competitive environment in which two
pairs play against each other and a revenue sharing treatment where earnings
are shared by team members. They find that men perform better than fe-
males within mixed pairs in a competition environment. In addition, women,
perform better in an entirely female team when matched against a male team.
However, both papers are limited to the study of pairs.
Cooperative attitudes of teams has been studied by Brewer and Kramer,
(1986). They vary group sizes, making teams of 7 or 31 subjects, to under-
stand the cooperative behaviour of subjects that play a public goods game.
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They observe that large groups of 31 subjects contribute less in a public
goods game than groups of 7 subjects, finding that cooperation in larger
groups over time is more complicated.
The effect of incentives on team production has been studied using fix
sized groups by Beersma et al. (2003) and Nalbaltian and Schotter (1997).
Beersma et al. (2003) find that a competitive reward structure improves
speed and diminishes free riding, while cooperative rewards promote accu-
racy in teams of four subjects. Nalbaltian and Schotter (1997) study team
production using groups of six people over various periods. They modify
incentives and the nature of the supervision (change the probability of being
caught shirking) but keep the number of team members constant and equal
six in all the cases. They find that relative performance schemes are the most
effective and that monitoring works when is efficient.
Other studies show the impact of identity and information on teams.
Eckel and Grossman (2005), explore how building team identity affects the
outcome of a public goods game of five players. They find that team identity
can help to overcome the free-riding problem and thus, improve team produc-
tion. However, they also point out that subjects do not feel identified with a
group unless they are able to interact with other group members. Moreover,
Charness et al. (2007) found that an stronger group identification enhances
coordination and surprisingly decreases cooperation. Related to interaction
between team members, Staats (2012) studies the effect of team familiarity
on production and finds that direct knowledge of who you are working with
increases production.1
Finally, some researchers focused on understanding the positive impact
of experience on group production. Fang (2012) developed a theoretical
model and tested it empirically to show how groups improve their efficiency
over time. Meanwhile, Reagans et al. (2005) explore the effect of the different
components of experience on team performance. In addition, Gardner et al.
(2012) show that resources integration capability boosts performance over
time. They are the only ones taking into account team members’ resources.
1Haas and Hansen (2007) analyse data from questionnaires obtained from a manage-
ment consulting firm and find that different information types affect production in different
ways and are not substitutes as claimed by previous research findings.
20
Still these resources are not material and they base their conclusions on a
survey done on two firms of the same sector.
Most empirical literature keeps the team size fixed and focus on other
issues not related to resources limitations. Meanwhile some theoretical re-
searchers in management and psychology suggest that teams are most effec-
tive when they have the minimum number of workers required to perform
the group task and get the job done (Guzzo, 1988; Hackman, 1990; Guzzo
and Shea, 1992; Hamilton et al. 2003). On the contrary, large teams have
poorer processes manifested in the understanding of the teams’ objective, in
rendering high level of participation and in support for innovation.
This existing literature focuses on different aspects of team production
and even study group size and its effect on production. However none of the
previous literature focuses on studying the joined effect of varying team size
and resources limitations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 describes in
detail the material and methods used to perform the experiment. Section 4
includes our main results. Section 5 presents the discussion.
Matherials and methods
Experimental design
We vary the composition of teams with respect to group size (L) and
resources constrain (K ). Each possible combination of L and K will represent
a different treatment. Figure 2.1 illustrates the total number of treatments
(15 red dots) conducted. The horizontal axis reflects the number of workers
(L) within the group while the vertical axis shows the number of resources
-or markers- (K ) provided to each group.
The groups in the main diagonal (green line) represent the five treat-
ments without resource limitations since R=0 (R=L-K ) in all the cases (i.e.
(1L, 1K ), (2L, 2K ), etc.). The cases below the main diagonal represent
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groups with resources limitations, i.e. R>0. Notice that, the larger the dis-
tance (R) from the diagonal the higher the coordination problem faced by the
team. For example, (K =1, L=5), imposes the maximal resource constraint
in our framework. Thus resource constraints increase from small, R=1 (dark
blue dotted line), where the resource constraint is minimal to large, R=4,
where the resource constraint on the team members is the largest.
Figure 2.1: Experimetal Design
Implementation
The experiment consisted of 33 experimental sessions performed between
November 2013 and October 2014 at Middlesex University London. Each of
the sessions lasted for an hour and we followed a between subjects design.
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The students were all freshmen taking different Business School degrees. Par-
ticipants were required to do an activity that entailed a standard task de-
signed by Bergstrom and Miller (1999). Participation was voluntary and no
incentives were provided apart from the pure enjoyment of the activity and
the competition encouraged between students in different groups. All partic-
ipants we asked to sign an informed consent. Those who did not sign were
allowed to leave the room.2
The allocation of students into groups was done randomly according to
a predetermined (sorting) protocol. The protocol involved assigning the first
person in the first column of the room to group 1, the second person to
group 2 and so on until all the students had been allocated to a team and all
the groups were complete. The randomization breaks any possible personal
ties among participants as they were neither self-selected into groups nor in
treatments.3
Once students were allocated into groups, they were provided with mark-
ers (K) and monitors explained that the activity involved constructing paper
aeroplanes as shown on the instruction sheet (Appendix A contains the in-
structions of how to build the aeroplanes provided to students). Remark
that under no resources limitations (R=0) there is no need to coordinate as
subjects have one marker each. It is scarcity of resources what forces them
to coordinate as they have fewer markers than team members (R>0). The
experiment started with a four-minute practice round. The results of the
practice session were not recorded. The practice session was followed by five
rounds of aeroplane building activity with each round lasting three minutes.
At the end of each round, we recorded the number of incomplete aeroplanes
(we only accepted aeroplanes identical to the original model); the number
of complete aeroplanes and those that were able to fly (we tested all the
aeroplanes ability to fly in front of the crowd who applauded the successful
aeroplanes). From now on we measure as output (Y ) the number of func-
tional aeroplanes produced by a group in each round.
2More than the 80% of the students asked to participate decided to do the activity and
thus signed the informed consent.
3This protocol ensures a random assignment of students to treatments and minimizes
any effect of team familiarity on production (Huckman et al. 2001; Easton and Rosenzweig,
2012; Staats, 2012).
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Overview
Table 2.1 shows the basic statistics. The sample consisted of 314 stu-
dents (148 females, 47.1%) randomly allocated into 87 groups. As mentioned
above, these students were divided into teams of 1 to 5 participants who had
access to different amounts of resources, also between 1 and 5 according to
the different cases shown in Figure 2.1.4
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics
mean min max observations
Group size 3.61 1 5 87 groups
Resources size 2.52 1 5 -
Female 47.1% 0 1 314 subjects
Results
Graphical Analysis
From now on we will focus on per capita output (y=Y/L). Figure 2.2
shows y as produced by every group in round 1. L is the number of peo-
ple in each group; K is the number of markers per group. The output per
capita (y=Y/L) of every group in shown in the vertical axis. In order to
make the exposition clearer the vertical axis has been fixed in the median
of all the groups (0.5 output per capita). Figure 2.2 illustrates that groups
placed along the diagonal – except (2L, 2K ) - produce much more than the
rest. In fact, those groups along K =1 notably underperform. By inspection,
4For every treatment (red dots in Figure 2.1) we have 6 independent observations at
group level except for (5L,1K) and (5L,2K): 5 observations, (5L,5K): 4 observations - and
(4L,4K): 7 observations.
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it seems that the further away a group is from the diagonal the smaller is
its per capita production. This reflects that when the team is inexperienced,
having greater resources limitations diminishes the production of that team.
Figure 2.2: Per capita production in round 1
Figure 2.3, shows the output produced by every group in the last period,
round 5. The vertical axis has been fixed in the median of all the groups (2
output per capita). In Figure 3, we observe that groups with small resources
limitations (R=1 and R=2) adapt to the restrictions and produce almost
the same as groups without restrictions. However, this is not true for groups
with severe limitations (R=3 and R=4), even after several rounds they are
not able to coordinate and produce as much as other groups with lesser lim-
itations.
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Figure 2.3: Per capita production in round 5
Statistical analysis
We estimate a double clustered OLS model where the dependent variable
is per capita outcome (y=Y/L). The list of independent variables includes:
the size of the groups, their access to resources and their experience in doing
the task. We specify the model as,
y = β0 + β1L+ β2R + β3round+ ε (2.1)
where, β1 measures the effect of team size, L, in per capita production. To
capture the effect of the resources limitations we include the distance be-
tween group size and resources, R. This variable will go from no resources
limitations (0 when L=K ) to the maximum level of resource limitations (4
when 5L, 1K ). β2, will then measure the effect of increasing resource con-
straints in per capita production. β3 accounts for the experience (round=1,
2, 3, 4, 5) while ε is the error term of our model. Table 2.2 summarizes the
results for the previous model.
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Table 2.2: Regression analysis
Note: All the regressions were performed using a double clustered OLS. The
clusters were performed according to groups and sessions. Since L=K=1 have
only one single worker (not teams) we decided not to include them in the
regression analysis. All the regressions were performed with and without controls
for gender, ethnicity, residency outside UK, presence of the module’s lecturer
during the experiment and presence of a non-cooperative subject in the group. *,
** and *** indicate significance at p= 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels of confidence,
respectively.
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Model I and II listed in Table 2.2 show the estimated values of the model
for all the groups with and without control variables (see notes in Table 2 for
details). The results are similar in both models. The coefficient associated
to L, is 0.10 and 0.14 respectively. In both models β1 is not significant (p=
0.407 in Model I and p= 0.286 in Model II). This implies that the size of
the group does not affect production per capita. Meanwhile, the coefficients
associated to the resources limitations are negative (-0.21 and -0.22) and sig-
nificant at a 5% level. The output per capita decreases when the access to
resources is more limited. In addition, the coefficients associated to learning,
are significant at a 1% level of confidence and positive (0.43 in Model I and
0.44 in Model II). The output per capita increases with the learning.
In Models III and IV we restrict the regression to those groups whose
resources are limited (R>0). The results are similar with and without control
variables. β1 is not significant, the size of the teams is not relevant when the
access to resources is limited. By contrast, the coefficient associated to the
resources limitations, β2 is negative and significant (10%) for both models
(-0.20 for Model III and -0.19 in Model IV). The higher the resources limita-
tions, the lower the output per capita. The coefficient associated to round is
0.41 and significant at a 1% level for both models. Experience has a positive
impact on resource limited production.
Finally, in Models V and VI we isolate groups with no resources lim-
itations, where L=K. Model V estimates the model with control variables
and Model VI performs the regression without controls. As L=K, we will
not have the variable R. Note that the coefficient β1 is 0.17 in Model V and
0.20 in Model VI, the size of the group is again not significant at any level.
Meanwhile, round is significant (p=0.000) and 0.50 in both regressions. This
coefficient is higher than in Models III and IV where there were resource
limitations. This hints that groups with unlimited access to resources learn
faster as they focus on improving their building skills and do not have to
learn how to coordinate. Also output per capita in groups with no resources
limitations is not affected by the team size.
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In conclusion, the size of the group is not relevant for per capita out-
put when resource constraints are not binding. However, when resources are
scarce, the distance between group size and amount of resources has a nega-
tive impact on output per capita. In addition, experience generates a learning
process that increases the outcome. This learning effect is also higher when
the access to resources is unconstrained, hinting that they learn faster when
they do not need to coordinate. In sum, groups under extreme resource re-
strictions face serious coordination issues that are unable to overcome over
time, while groups with small resources restrictions are able though experi-
ence to overcome coordination problems.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the learning process for the teams. L is the number
of workers in each group; K is the number of markers in each group. Output
per capita (y) is shown in the vertical axis. Note that the axis has been fixed
to the average value of both rounds, 1. We can observe that almost all the
groups increase per-capita output from round 1 to round 5. In spite of this,
some groups learn faster than others. This is particularly the case where
groups have almost no resources limitations. At the same time, when the re-
source constraints get increasingly severe, groups start to underperform even
after the first period. This suggests that with large resources limitations,
groups barely improve with learning as their coordination problem is too big
to solve.
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Figure 2.4: Per capita production in round 1 (in purple) and round 5 (in red
and orange)
Entropy measures
Another way of analysing the bi-dimensional problem (size x resources
limitations) proposed in this paper is the use of entropy. Entropy measures
the degree of diversity of a system (Masisi et al. 2008). In our case the degree
of diversity could be measured using their abilities, or skills, at producing
aeroplanes and how they evolve between rounds 1 and 5. Each group is en-
dowed with their own abilities and different capital endowments (markers).
Using entropy we aim to measure how each group evolves in (per-capita)
production and whether they achieve their maximum potential with time.
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We calculate Shannon entropy (Shannon, 1948), defined by,
H =
∑
i
pilnpi (2.2)
where pi is the probability that a certain level of output, y, appears in groups
of size L, with capital endowment K. The measure, H therefore allows us to
measure per-capita output diversity in our experiment. Shannon entropy
quantifies this diversity:
• The minimum value for H is zero, i.e. the per-capita output observed
across all groups with the same resources and size is the same across
periods.
• The maximal value of H occurs when each group produces (per-capita)
output that is dissimilar.
Hence, a large value of H implies that each group produces a different
level of per-capita output, hence resulting in maximum diversity (in per-
capita) output. Therefore larger numbers result in greater levels of diversity,
i.e. the probability that any level of per-capita output would appear.
Figure 2.5 shows the Shannon Entropy-H estimation for our data. The
horizontal axis represents the round for which the entropy is shown on the
graph. An important result, at aggregate level, is that entropy stabilizes with
time. That is, with experience, groups converge in production per capita.
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Figure 2.5: Shannon entropy measurement for rounds 1 to 5
Now we look at per-capita production diversity at the group level. Note,
we classify groups according to their resource constraints, i.e. L-K=R,R =
0, 1, 2, 3, 4. Recall, from Figure 2.1 that along the diagonal (i.e. R=0) groups
are not resource constrained. However, as we move away from the diago-
nal they are, and the resource constraint becomes increasingly binding as
we reach the maximal resource constraint at R=4. We first measure the
per-capita diversity (as given by Shannon entropy measure) in each similar
resource constrained group. We then approximate these points using an OLS
linear regression for round 1 and, we repeat the process for round 5, where
Ht = bt + atRt, where t = 1, 5. Figure 2.6 plots both regressions. The hor-
izontal axis represents the difference between group size and their access to
resources, R (L-K ). We observe that there is a negative relationship between
resource constraints and output per-capita. This is true for both rounds; 1
and 5. A negative gradient suggests that the diversity in production dimin-
ishes across groups as they get increasingly resource constrained.
Secondly, by comparing regressions for rounds 1 and 5 in Figure 2.6,
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one observes that they tend to converge as the resource constraint, R, be-
comes increasingly binding. This suggests that groups with greater resources
increase their diversity with time in terms of per-capita production. Mean-
while, highly resource constrained groups cannot achieve their optimal diver-
sity with time, suggesting that resource constraints are a crucial element in
the learning process related to production.
Note that, our results is are similar to what is shown in the manage-
ment and psychology literature (Guzzo, 1988; Hackman, 1990; Guzzo and
Shea, 1992; Hamilton et al. 2003). They found that increasing group size is
detrimental to performance. Meanwhile, we find that going off the diagonal
moves groups away from achieving full entropy and therefore achieving their
optimal way of producing.
Figure 2.6: Shannon Entropy-H: Linear Regressions for rounds 1 and 5
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Discussion
We ran an aeroplane building task for undergraduate students. The stu-
dents were not paid for the activity and their main motivation was inherent.
The students were organized into different groups based upon a well-defined
protocol. The research question we asked is how varying group size and
resource constraints affect group productivity. We find clear evidence that
substituting capital with labour is not possible over time. In fact, per-capita
production suffers as the resource constraint becomes worse and there comes
a point at which not even more coordination can help to overcome resources
limitations.
We further use a measure of entropy to study how each group evolves
with time. We find that no or low resource constrained groups (R = 0, 1, 2)
perform better in the activity. Highly resource constrained groups (R = 4, 5),
on the other hand, underperform as the size of the resource limitation in-
creases. We find a negative relationship between the Shannon entropy mea-
sure and resource constraints. We achieve maximal entropy for the least
resource constrained groups. This implies that they achieve maximum di-
versity in terms of per-capita output. Highly resource constrained groups
do not achieve their maximal potential even after carrying out the activity
repeatedly.
In terms of coordination, we find that if a group is not resource con-
strained then effectively group size does not matter. Our results points to-
wards what could be an important oversight in the management literature
when they look at group production and output. They argue that due to
coordination problems larger groups are not effective. However we show that
resources constraint plays a key role in explaining the relationship between
team size and production. When resource constraints are trivial then effec-
tively group size does not seem to matter as large and small groups produce
similar amounts of per capita output. However when team size and available
resources are increasingly divergent, even better coordination cannot help
avoid the fall in per capita production.
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Chapter 3
Cheating and money
manipulation
Abstract
We use different incentive schemes to study how subjects cheat when they
are asked to reveal a piece of private information. We find no significant
evidence of cheating when there is no financial incentive associated with the
reports, but cheating does occur when the reports determine financial gains
or losses (in different treatments). No evidence of increased cheating is found
to avoid a loss in the standard case in which subjects receive their earnings
at the end of the session. When subjects manipulate the possible earnings,
we find evidence of less cheating in the loss setting. We interpret our findings
in terms of the moral cost of cheating and differences in the perceived trust
and beliefs in the gain and the loss frames.
Introduction
Many economic interactions require that individuals disclose informa-
tion that they possess. Examples include a car dealer selling a used car, a
broker giving advice on the best mortgage, or a professor writing a reference
letter for a student or a colleague. In all these environments with asym-
metric information, it may be socially-optimal for individuals to reveal their
information truthfully. However, economic and personal incentives may lead
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people to deliberately misreport such information. One may shade the truth
(so common in reference letters as to be the norm) or simply prevaricate.
Such dishonesty is a form of cheating behavior, a term that also includes
activities such as theft, embezzlement, and bribery.
There are noteworthy economic consequences associated with cheating
behavior. Indeed, Cohn et al. (2014) point to cheating in the business
culture as a force that is plausibly responsible (at least in part) for the all-
too-common scandals in business and politics. Tax evasion and avoidance led
to diminished tax revenue of approximately e1 trillion in the Eurozone, ac-
cording to the European Commission, and the IRS estimates the overall tax
gap in the U.S. represents about 16% of the estimated actual tax liability. In
the developing world, corruption and cheating are quite prevalent; numerous
dictators (e.g. Suharto, Marcos, and Duvalier) have shamelessly looted their
countries, which have suffered greatly after the fall of the dictatorship; such
corruption hinders investment and growth. In addition, recent experimental
evidence has demonstrated that setting goals (Schweitzer et al. 2004) or us-
ing policies such as team incentives (Conrads et al. 2013), random bonuses
(Gill et al. 2013), or performance-based bonuses (Jacob and Levitt, 2003;
Martinelli et al. 2015) can exacerbate cheating behavior.
In this paper, we investigate the effects of incentives on cheating be-
havior in both the loss and gain domains when people are asked to reveal a
piece of private information. This information concerns a state of the world,
whose report only determines the payoff of the reporting agent. We focus on
behavior when the money to be received is framed alternatively as a gain or a
loss. There is evidence that loss contracts (i.e., up-front bonuses that workers
can lose) increase workplace productivity (Brookset al. 2012; Hossain and
List, 2012; Fryer et al. 2012). Further, workers might prefer loss contracts as
a way to improve their performance and thus increase their expected earn-
ings (Imas et al. 2016). However, Cameron and Miller (2009) and Grolleau
et al. (2016) find that subjects cheat more in a loss frame when reporting
their own performance on a real-effort task. Cameron et al. (2010) argue
that paying people in advance for performing a task might induce a feeling
of entitlement, and this might facilitate or even encourage unethical behavior.
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In this paper, we investigate whether people cheat more in a loss frame
when their private information concerns the state of the world. Since a loss
contract usually requires that people receive the money in advance, we con-
ducted treatments (in the gain and the loss frame) with and without money
manipulation, as this may affect the “sense of ownership” and what could
be termed the moral cost of lying. This device helps us to tease apart the
effects of the frame and the manipulation of money on cheating behavior.
We consider an environment where the outcome is independent of one’s
level of talent or ability, so that there should in principle be no measure of
one’s worth attached to the report (of course considerations of self-image and
social image may still affect the reports). We use a variant of the seminal
design developed by Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi (2013). Each participant
is asked to privately roll a die (6-sided in the original experiment, 10-sided
in ours), so that the experimenter cannot determine the veracity of the sub-
sequent report 1.
The beauty of this design is that while the experimenter cannot know
whether an individual is lying, statistical tests on the aggregate data show
the extent to which the experimental population distorts the truth. Standard
economic models predict that people will cheat in the absence of punishment
when there is incentive to do so, but will otherwise be indifferent regarding
telling the truth.
We first compare behavior in a Baseline treatment where subjects receive
a fixed amount regardless of their report with the behavior of people when
their financial payoff depends on the reported outcome. To our knowledge,
this is the first paper that directly tests whether subjects lie in the absence
of incentives when their behavior does not impose any payoff externality on
others. We then proceed to examine behavior in the loss and the gain do-
1We use a 10-sided die to increase the number of possible outcomes. Studies by, e.g.,
Hao and Houser (2010), Shalvi et al. (2011), Conrads et al. (2013), Gravert (2013), Jiang
(2013) and Ploner and Regner (2013) have also used the die-rolling task. See Abeler et
al. (2016) for a recent meta-study. Other studies have used the sender-receiver game
where cheating is strategic (i.e., the sender needs to send a message to the receiver about
the real state of the world and the receiver may believe it or not). This includes, among
others, Gneezy (2005), Sutter (2009), Lundquist et al. (2009), Erat and Gneezy (2012),
Erat (2013) and Vanberg (2015).
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mains, since the notion of loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) is so
pervasive. In our standard treatments, we give subjects their earnings in a
closed envelope at the end of the session, but we change the reference point.
In the gain setting, the reported number determines the amount to be placed
(by the experimenter) into the envelope, while in the loss setting all envelopes
contain the maximum possible earnings and we subtract an amount that de-
pends on the reported number. Arguably, loss aversion would predict more
cheating with the loss framing, since giving up money would seem to be more
unpleasant than simply not receiving money.2 Finally, having observed our
results in these treatments, we implemented treatments in which the partic-
ipants either took their earnings from an envelope (gain treatment) or put
money into an envelope after having received the maximum possible payoff
at the beginning of the session (loss treatment).
How would loss aversion actually apply in a cheating environment? As
mentioned above, Cameron and Miller (2009), Cameron et al. (2010) and
Grolleau et al. (2016) observe that loss aversion encourages cheating in real-
effort tasks. Their tasks differ from ours in that one would expect more
concern about one’s social image when one’s ability (or “honor”) is at stake.
Previous experimental evidence (e.g., Ertac, 2011; Charness et al. 2014)
shows that people are much less accurate in processing information when
this information is self-relevant than when it concerns an outcome that is
unaffected by one’s level of talent. Thus, we might expect more cheating in
a self-relevant performance task than in our task (Gravert, 2013).
The closest paper to ours is Schindler and Pfattheicher (2017). They
ask subjects to roll a 6-sided die 75 times and then report the number of ‘4s’
they have obtained. While subjects report more ‘4s’ in the loss frame, the
authors find no evidence of cheating in the gain frame, contrary to other ex-
perimental evidence (Abeler et al. 2016). Another salient difference between
our designs is that we ask subjects to report the outcome of a die roll, while
the multiple die rolls in Schindler and Pfattheicher (2017) allows subjects to
2Garbarino et al. (2016) derive a prediction that people will lie more frequently when
the probability of a (the) bad outcome is lower, since the higher expected payoff means
that the “loss” avoided by lying compared to reference point is greater. They find support
from an analysis of studies in the literature as well as new experiments. See also Abeler
et al (2016) and Gneezy et al. (2016) for other experiments that vary the probability of a
(the) bad outcome.
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cheat more than once (see also Shalvi et al. 2011, Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-
Heusi 2013).3 In addition, we complement their findings by looking at the
moral costs and the effects of money manipulation on the reported outcomes.
We expect that moral concerns and social norms will interact with the
motivation to cheat. With the mounting evidence on cheating behavior, some
recent models include a term for the moral cost of lying but restrict this to
be a function of the distance between the material payoff from cheating and
that from not cheating (e.g., Lundquist et al.; 2009, Garbarino et al. 2016).
However, it is likely that other elements should be present in the arguments
of a function reflecting the moral cost of cheating. For example, Utikal and
Fischbacher (2013) find that nuns tend to under-report the die roll, per-
haps wishing to appear modest in their demands. Subjects also refrain from
cheating when the opportunity is made salient (Mazar et al. 2008; Gino et
al. 2009). The meta-study in Abeler et al. (2016) indeed concludes that the
desire to appear honest may be a key driving force in explaining cheating
behavior in the die-rolling task.4
In our setting, if you are given money and hold it in your possession,
you may feel that you have been trusted (the mental-cheating condition could
be seen as being a strong demand effect). Keeping the money with which
you have been entrusted may feel more like stealing than taking money that
you’ve been invited to take.5
Trust and morality are important and people may be sensitive to small
clues and considerations (Mazar et al. 2008). If one feels trusted, this could
mean that one believes that the trustor believes that the trustee will be-
3Schindler and Pfattheicher (2017) consider a second study in mTurk, where subjects
self-report the outcome of tossing a coin (Bucciol, and Piovesan, 2011). In this task, where
cheating is a binary decision, Schindler and Pfattheicher (2017) find that cheating occurs
in both the gain and the loss frame, with more cheating being observed in the later.
4See also Rosenbaum et al. (2014), Kajackaite and Gneezy (2015), Gneezy et al. (2016),
and Dufwenberg and Dufwenberg (2016) for related evidence, and Mazar at al. (2008) for
a theory of self-concept maintenance.
5This resembles the idea of omission-commission in Spranca, Minsk and Baron (1991).
However, participants in our experiment are asked to enter the number they have obtained
in the computer screen, thus cheating requires acts of commission even in the loss condition
(Cameron and Miller, 2009).
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have in a trustworthy manner. If one doesn’t, then one may experience guilt
(Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007, 2009;
Battigalli et al. 2013). We attempt to better understand the interplay be-
tween incentives to cheat in the gain and loss domain and the moral costs of
cheating.
In fact, some of our experimental results will surprise many readers. We
do find evidence across many of our treatments that cheating is more fre-
quent when this affects the reporter’s material payoffs than when it doesn’t.
However, in the standard treatments where participants simply receive their
payoffs in an envelope, we find no evidence of more cheating with a loss
frame than with a gain frame. We felt that two elements could have helped
to induce this finding. First, reports are constrained to be one of the 10
possible outcomes of the die roll. If subjects cheat maximally in the gain
treatment (given their moral costs), one shall not observe more cheating in
the loss frame. Second, the sense of ownership might have been too weak
in this design. We addressed these points by affecting the moral costs of
cheating and implement treatments in which the participants actually phys-
ically handle the money. Indeed, requiring the participants to engage in
money manipulation led to less cheating. To our surprise, however, we find
substantially less cheating in this loss treatment than in the corresponding
gain treatment. In fact, there is no significant difference between behavior
in the baseline treatment and in the loss treatment with money manipulation.
Thus, we find ourselves swimming upstream with our experimental re-
sults. We do interpret our results as reflecting differences in perceived trust
and beliefs. We suspect that there were different moral costs and beliefs
in different treatments. Specifically, people in the money-manipulation loss
treatment might have been more likely to feel that they had been trusted
with the full potential payoff in the beginning and might have had different
beliefs about the beliefs of the experimenter than people in the corresponding
gain treatment. Further, the decision to return money in the loss framing
could be seen as warm-glow giving (Andreoni, 1989, 1990), especially in the
money-manipulation loss treatment, where subjects had to place the amount
to be returned in an envelope. Hence, it seems unrealistic to ignore the psy-
chological (moral) costs and benefits that are likely to be involved in deciding
whether (and by how much) to cheat.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We present the exper-
imental design, implementation, and hypotheses in Section 2, and describe
the experimental results in Section 3. We provide some discussion and con-
clude in Section 4 and 5.
Experimental design and hypotheses
Experimental design
A total of 426 subjects were recruited to participate in our experiment.
We use the procedures in Fischbacher and Follmi-Heusi (2013) and add our
experiment at the end of a previous experiment that took around 90 min-
utes.6 All sessions were run at the Laboratory for Research in Experimental
Economics (LINEEX) at the University of Valencia.
At the beginning of our experiment, subjects received a 10-sided die and
a copy of the experimental instructions.7 Their task consisted of rolling the
die privately in their cubicles and reporting the number from the first roll on
the computer screen. Subjects could roll the die as many times as desired,
but were told that only the first throw was relevant for their payment.
6Subjects in our experiment did not receive any feedback about the previous one until
the end of the session. Our experiment was presented as an independent task to subjects,
in which they could earn some additional money (all subjects decided to participate). This
procedure is frequently used in the literature due to the short nature of the task.
7A translated version of the instructions can be found in Appendix B.
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Table 3.1: Payoffs (in Euros) in each treatment depending on the reported
number (0 to 9)
Number 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Baseline e2.5 e2.5 e2.5 e2.5 e2.5 e2.5 e2.5 e2.5 e2.5 e2.5
Gain e1 e1 e1.5 e2 e2.5 e3 e-3.5 e4 e4.5 e5
Loss e-5 e-4 e-3.5 e-3 e-2.5 e-2 e-1.5 e-1 e-0.5 e0
We had five different treatments , which varied the payoffs that subjects
received for reporting the outcome of the die (see Table 3.1) and the extent
to which subjects manipulated their potential earnings.
• Baseline treatment (Baseline): At the end of the session, subjects
received a sealed envelope with a fixed amount (e2.5), regardless of the
number they reported.
• Gain with no money manipulation (Gain-NO): As in the base-
line, subjects received their earnings in a sealed envelope at the end
of the session. In this treatment, earnings ranged between e0 (when
reporting 0) and e5 (when reporting 9).
• Loss with no money manipulation (Loss-NO): Before starting
the session, subjects were informed that they had been allocated with
an initial endowment of e5 to be kept in an envelope by the experi-
menter. Subjects were told that this would be used in a subsequent
experiment. After finishing the first experiment (90 minutes), subjects
were reminded about their e5 and presented with our task. Subjects
knew that the reported number would determine the amount to be de-
ducted from the envelope. This was given to subjects at the end of the
session.
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• Gain with money manipulation (Gain-MM): Again, earnings in-
creased with the reported number but subjects had an envelope with
e5 on their desk before rolling the die. Each subject had to extract
their earnings from the envelope upon rolling the die and reporting the
outcome on the computer screen.
• Loss with money manipulation (Loss-MM): Subjects received
the initial endowment (e5) at the beginning of the session. They could
keep this endowment on their table or their pockets. After finishing the
first experiment (90 minutes), subjects were asked to take their initial
endowment and were given an empty envelope. Subjects rolled the die,
reported the outcome, and placed the amount to be returned in the
envelope before leaving the room.
Before proceeding to the hypotheses, there are some aspects of our ex-
perimental design that are worth mentioning. First, earnings associated with
each reported number were equivalent in the Gain and the Loss treatments.
Second, we announced the initial endowment at the beginning of the session
to subjects in the Loss treatments to trigger loss aversion. Finally, subjects in
money-manipulation treatments had a second opportunity to cheat by misre-
porting the amount of money they had to take from or leave in the envelope.
In this respect, our evidence is consistent with Cameron and Miller (2009)
or Schindler and Pfattheicher (2017); we do not find that subjects recorded
an outcome that did not correspond to the amount of money they took from
or left into the envelope.
Hypotheses
Consider first the Baseline treatment. If people have standard prefer-
ences, we should expect reports to follow an equal distribution. We should
also expect an equal distribution of reported numbers if lying has a cost.
Even if one cares about social image, it is not obvious that rolling a higher
number is better. Since we are not aware of any paper that directly tests for
cheating behavior in the absence of economic incentives, our first prediction
is:
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Hypothesis 1: The distribution of reports in the Baseline treatment is
not significantly different from the uniform distribution.
In all of our treatments except the Baseline, people have a financial
incentive to cheat (Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi 2013, Shalvi et al. 2011,
Abeler et al. 2016). If people value money and the cost of lying is not ex-
treme, we should expect to see reports in the Gain and Loss treatments that
are significantly higher than that from either the uniform distribution or the
Baseline. Thus, our second hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 2: The numbers reported in the Gain and Loss treatments
will be significantly higher than those in the uniform distribution and in the
Baseline.
In line with the literature on loss aversion (Kahenman and Tversky,
1979) and a plausible link between loss aversion and choices made with gain
and loss frames, we expected more cheating with loss framing, leading to our
third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: The numbers reported in a Loss treatment will be sig-
nificantly higher than those reported in the corresponding Gain treatment.
While cheating has clear financial benefits in the Loss and Gain treat-
ments, it may also have a moral cost, e.g., subjects might be averse to cheat
due to an intrinsic motivation to be honest (e.g., Lundquist et al., 2009),
social image (the choice is observed by the experimenter) (e.g., Gneezy et
al. 2016), a desire to hold a positive self view (e.g., Mazar et al. 2008), or
some form of guilt aversion (e.g., Battagalli and Dufwenberg, 2007, 2009).
A moral cost of cheating has been useful to explain why we observe truth-
shading rather than universal reporting of either the true value or the maxi-
mum value in previous experiments. We therefore feel that entrusting people
with money (on their desk or at the beginning of the session) will increase
the moral cost of lying, leading to our final hypothesis8:
8One alternative, however, would be considering that there is an interplay between
the type of incentives and the manipulation of money. One can thus argue that the
manipulation can trigger the loss aversion, thus subjects can feel more entitled to keep
the money they have manipulated in the Loss-MM. If that is the case we expect for the
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Hypothesis 4: The numbers reported in the money-manipulation treat-
ments will be lower than in the corresponding treatments without money ma-
nipulation.
Results
Figure 3.1 displays the distribution of the reported numbers in each of
the treatments. Table 3.2 summarizes our data by including information on
the frequency and cumulative distribution of reported numbers. The aver-
age reported number is above the mean expected outcome (predicted by the
uniform distribution) of 4.5 in all the treatments. In fact, more high num-
bers (5-9) are reported than low numbers (0-4) in all treatments. Consistent
with previous findings (Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi 2013, Utikal and Fis-
chbacher 2013, Shalvi et al. 2011, Abeler et al. 2016), there is no single large
spike at the payoff-maximizing outcome.9
outcomes to be higher in Loss-MM than Loss-NO.
9We also note that there is no significant gender difference in any of the five treatments.
The overall average number reported by males (females) was 5.849 (5.633). The overall
proportion of zeroes reported by males (females) was 0.050 (0.048), while the proportion
of nines reported by males (females) was 0.171 (0.172). See, among others, Cappelen et al.
(2012), Childs (2012), Gylfason et al. (2013) and Pascual-Ezama et al. (2015) for other
studies showing no gender differences in cheating behavior.
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of reported numbers per treatment
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics: Frequency and cumulative distribution of
reports
Tr Obs. Mean SE 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Base- 88 4.977 0.304 4 10 11 7 3 10 8 14 12 9
line (.046) (.159) (.284) (.364) (.398) (.511) (.602) (.761) (.898) (1)
Gain 89 6.281 0.270 3 3 3 6 6 8 8 16 16 20
NO (.034) (.067) (.101) (.168) (.236) (.326) (.416) (.596) (.775) (1)
Loss 84 6.214 0.291 4 4 4 3 2 8 12 15 12 20
NO (.048) (.095) (.143) (.179) (.202) (.298) (.440) (.619) (.761) (1)
Gain 84 5.952 0.271 3 5 2 5 7 6 8 24 14 10
MM (.036) (.095) (.119) (.179) (.262) (.333) (.429) (.714) (.881) (1)
Loss 81 5.198 0.332 7 5 7 6 10 6 4 12 10 14
MM (.086) (.148) (.235) (.309) (.432) (.506) (.556) (.704) (.827) (1)
Note: Frequency is in whole numbers and cumulative distribution is in parentheses. SE = standard error.
We proceed to test our hypotheses with both non-parametric tests and
regression analysis. First, the Kruskal-Wallis test rejects the hypothesis that
observations in the different treatments come from the same distribution
(χ2 = 14.95, p = 0.005), thus monetary incentives and/or the manipula-
tion of money seems to affect the reported outcomes. The results of out
non-parametric analysis are summarized in Table 3.3.10 We first investigate
whether the reported outcomes in each of treatment differ from the actual
expected outcomes (i.e., the equal distribution) using a χ2 test, since the
outcomes of the die rolling are numbers from 0 to 9. We also Wilcoxon rank-
sum and Kolmogorov-Smirnov non-parametric tests to compare the reports
in the Gain and Loss treatments with those in the Baseline (where subjects
have no incentives to cheat).
10Throughout the paper, we round all p-values to three decimal places. The interested
reader on the comparison between the reported outcomes in each treatment and expected
actual outcomes using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test or the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of
cumulative distributions can consult Appendix A (Table 3.1). This includes information on
the fraction of subjects who cheat to avoid the worst possible outcome using the estimation
method in Garbarino et al. (2016).
50
Table 3.3: Non-parametric analysis on cheating behaviour
Expected Baseline outcomes
outcomes
Treatment χ2 test Wilcoxon rank-sum (Z) Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS)
Baseline 12.00 - -
(0.213)
Gain-NO 38.98 3.128 0.195
(0.000) (0.001) (0.024)
Loss-NO 39.57 2.880 0.213
(0.000) (0.002) (0.013)
Gain-MM 45.11 2.165 0.070
(0.000) (0.015) (0.039)
Loss-MM 11.72 0.610 0.185
(0.230) (0.271) (0.488)
Note: p-values (in parentheses) reflect one-tailed tests. The χ2 test
compares expected to actual outcomes.
Hypothesis 1 states that there will be no differences between reports in
the Baseline treatment and the expected outcomes of the die roll. In fact,
while we do see a slight tendency towards reporting higher numbers, the χ2
test shows no significant difference between the reports in the Baseline and
the actual expected outcomes (p = 0.213). Thus, we see no significant evi-
dence of distortion in the reports made when there is no financial incentive
for misreporting.
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Result 1. There is no evidence of cheating in the absence of economic
incentives.
We expected more cheating in our four treatments where there is a finan-
cial incentive to report a higher number than was actually rolled, as stated
in Hypothesis 2. Indeed, the Gain-NO and Loss-NO treatments have much
higher numbers than the expected true outcomes (p = 0.001) or the Baseline
(p = 0.024). There is also evidence in the Gain-MM treatment of distortion
relative to the expected outcomes (p = 0.001) and the Baseline (p = 0.039).
However, there is surprisingly little difference between the reports made in
the Loss-MM and Baseline treatments or between the reports in Loss-MM
and the expected actual outcomes (p = 0.230).
Result 2. Incentives affect cheating in all treatments except in the Loss-
MM, where the distribution of reported numbers is very close to the expected
actual outcomes and the Baseline distribution.
Hypothesis 3 predicts that presumed loss aversion will manifest in more
cheating in reports made in the loss frame than those made in the gain frame.
As suggested in the preceding paragraph, the observed patterns do not sup-
port this hypothesis. In fact, there is very little difference in the reports
across the Gain-NO and Loss-NO; the average report is in fact only slightly
higher in the Gain-NO treatment (6.281 versus 6.214). The respective one-
tailed test statistics and p-values are Z = -0.089, p = 0.536 and KS = 0.042,
p = 0.500. What may be even more surprising is that there is substantially
less cheating in Loss-MM than in Gain-MM. In any case, we have strong
evidence to reject Hypothesis 3 in the money-manipulation treatments.
Result 3. Incentives in the loss domain do not increase cheating behav-
ior compared with incentives in the gain domain.
Finally, Hypothesis 4 predicts that money manipulation will lead to less
cheating due to an increased moral cost of lying. We find strong support for
the hypothesis when we compare reports made in the Loss-MM and Loss-NO
treatments. In fact, the median (modal) report in the Loss-MM treatment is
5 (7), while the median (modal) report in the Loss-NO treatment is 7 (9). The
Wilcoxon test gives Z = 2.128, p = 0.016, while the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
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test gives KS = 0.230, p = 0.008, both one-tailed tests. The differences
across the reports in the Gain-MM and Gain-NO treatments are consider-
ably more modest and not statistically significant. Here the Wilcoxon test
gives Z = 1.144, p = 0.126, while the Kolmogorov test gives KS = 0.119, p
= 0.254, both one-tailed tests. Thus, we see that money manipulation makes
a real difference with a loss framing, but much less of a difference with a gain
framing.
Result 4. Money manipulation reduces cheating behavior, especially in
the loss framing.
We now proceed to the regression analysis. The model used is a Tobit
since the sample is censored in the lower (0) and upper (9) limit. In Table
we report the results of the Tobit analysis, where the set of independent vari-
ables include dummies for the gain frame and the manipulation of money, as
well as the interaction term.11 The reported standard errors (in parentheses)
are clustered at the session level. Our first regression in column (1) uses the
data from all treatments except the Baseline. Specifications (2) to (5) give
the results for different Tobit models, depending on whether or not subjects
manipulate the money and the frame.
As already suggested, there is no evidence of loss aversion in our data. If
there is no money-manipulation, the behavior in the Loss frame is not signif-
icantly different from the behavior in the Gain frame. Money-manipulation
does reduce the reported outcomes, but the effect is only significant in the
loss frame, in fact subjects cheat more in the Gain than in the Loss treatment
with money-manipulation.
11In our Tobit analysis in Appendix A (Table 3.2) the set of independent variables
include dummies for each of the treatment conditions, which are then compared with the
Baseline reports. We note that ordinary least squares regressions provide qualitatively the
same results and similar levels of significance. Our findings are also robust to controlling
for the earnings of the previous experiment. While the subjects were not informed about
such earnings when rolling the die, one might argue that they might had formed some
beliefs to be used as a reference point. Table 3.1 in Appendix A presents the correlation
between previous earnings and the reports.
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Table 3.4: Regression Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pooled data No-Manipulation Manipulation Gains Looses
Constant 6.624*** 6.628*** 5.368*** 6.636*** 6.678***
(0.459) (0.480) (0.127) (0.231) (0.534)
Gain 0.061 0.061 0.757**
(0.505) (0.527) (0.365)
Money-Manipulation -1.254*** -0.531 -1.285**
(0.476) (0.386) (0.553)
Gain x 0.696
Money-Manipulation (0.605)
Sigma 3.350*** 3.376*** 3.326*** 3.043** 3.685***
(0.187) (0.197) (0.345) (0.197) (0.192)
Num. observations 338 173 165 173 165
(uncensored) (257) (126) (131) (173) (120)
Pseudo LL -762.751 -380.477 -382.262 -386.015 -374.673
Prob > F 0.076 0.901 0.157 0.265 0.031
Notes: Specification (1) includes data from all treatments except the Baseline.
Specification (2) includes data from only the Gain-NO and Loss-NO treatments,
while (3) includes data only from the Gain-MM and Loss-MM treatments.
Specification (4) includes data only from the Gain-NO and Gain-MM treatments,
(5) includes only data from the Loss-NO and Loss-MM treatments. ** and ***
indicate significance at the p = 0.05 and p = 0.01 levels, respectively, two-tailed
tests.
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Discussion
Our results confirm some expected patterns. For example, people do not
lie when there is no financial incentive to report an outcome different from
the one that actually occurred; we find no significant difference between the
reports made in this environment and the expected distribution of actual
outcomes. We also observe considerable dishonesty when there is a financial
incentive to report a higher number, which is consistent with previous work.
Finally, money-manipulation seems to affect the moral cost of cheating and
thus the reported outcomes.
But our other results are surprising. We expected to find evidence of
more cheating when earnings associated to the report were framed as a loss,
but we found absolutely no evidence of this in a standard environment. When
we conducted treatments where the participants were given envelopes with
the funds and then had to physically handle the money, we observe less cheat-
ing in the loss frame than in the gain frame! In fact, there was only a modest
and insignificant difference in the reports in the Baseline treatment and the
loss frame with money manipulation. This last result would appear to turn
conventional wisdom on its head.
What could explain these unexpected results? An important considera-
tion regarding loss aversion is the reference point for gains and losses and this
may be unclear in laboratory settings (Terzi et al. 2016). While loss aversion
and reference dependence are widely accepted, the generality of loss-aversion
seems less than universal. A number of studies (e.g., Erev, Ert, and Yechiam,
2008; Harinck et al. 2007; Kermer et al. 2006) examining the effect of losses
in decision-making under risk and uncertainty in fact find no evidence of
loss aversion, as it occurs in our standard treatments. It is possible that
subjects in our gain and loss treatments were already cheating maximally
(given their moral costs), thus the (constrained) task prevented us to find
more cheating under loss aversion; the spikes are in fact at the maximum
value in the standard treatments.12 We decided to affect the moral costs of
12Some people seem to care about reporting a higher number in the Baseline treatment,
since more high numbers (5-9) are reported than low numbers in this case – more than
60% of the reports are high numbers. While there is no overall difference between the
reports in the Baseline and the expected true values, it is nevertheless the case that this
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cheating by asking subjects to manipulate the money. The spikes at higher
numbers other than the maximum value in the money-manipulation treat-
ments suggest that many people who choose to lie do not wish to either be
seen as a liar (in fact by far the highest spike in all of the data is the spike
at 7 in the Gain-MM treatment).
To our surprise, however, our null result was not driven by a lack of a
sense of “ownership” of the funds as we find evidence of reversed loss aversion
in the money-manipulation treatments. Harinck et al. (2007) document also
this effect in a series of experiments where subjects are asked to rate how
(un)pleasant would be finding (losing) small amounts of money. They argue
that the negative feelings associated with small losses may be outweighed by
the positive feelings associated with equivalent small gains. In our experi-
ment, these feelings are likely to be affected by the damage to one’s self-image
and the beliefs about what is expected. We suspect that if one feels trusted,
one is more likely to respond in an honest or trustworthy manner.
It could be that it is more costly for subjects to cheat when they receive
the money in advance because they feel they have been trusted. If the feeling
of being trusted leads to different beliefs about what is expected, it could be
the case that one believes that the trustor believes that one will behave in
a trustworthy manner; otherwise, one may experience disutility from guilt.13
Perhaps people in the money-manipulation treatments had different beliefs
about the expectations of the experimenter than people in the other variable-
pay treatments. Having been endowed with visible money in the beginning
of an experiment in the loss frame may also make cheating more salient than
having an envelope from which people can later take money. Mazar et al.
(2008) and Gino et al. (2009) find that subjects cheat less when cheating is
salient. By asking subjects to return the money in the loss treatment, we
might also trigger impure altruism (Andreoni, 1989, 1990).
60% is meaningful. The binomial test tells us the probability that 53 or more of 88 random
draws in this treatment being high numbers is only 2.8%.
13This goes to the issue of whether one is more honest if one feels trusted. Some evidence
is provided for this idea in Charness (2000). Additionally, Campbell (1935), May and Loyd
(1993) and Haines et al. (1986) find that an honor system induces more honesty than does
a proctor. See also Mazar et al. (2008) or Gino et al. (2009) for the related evidence on
the importance of honor codes on cheating behavior.
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One might nevertheless wonder why there was more cheating in the loss
frame than in the gain frame in other studies. In our study, there is nothing
regarding one’s own ability, while the work of Cameron and Miller (2009),
Cameron et al. (2010) or Grolleau et al. (2016) involves reporting one’s own
performance in a cognitive task. One’s judgement about own ability seems
to be more malleable than one’s judgement about events over which one has
no control, as seen in the updating studies mentioned earlier. Indeed, lying
is likely to have some moral cost, but one would like to appear talented or
capable in the eyes of those who may be watching or even one’s self; in fact,
this may not even be a conscious tendency (see Charness et al. 2014). Using
the die-roll task, Schindler and Pfattheicher (2017) allows for multiple rolls of
the die and find that reports are larger under loss aversion, but the authors
do not find evidence that people cheat in a gain setting. We complement
their findings by also looking at the effects of the moral costs, which seems
to be a crucial element in understanding cheating behavior.
Conclusion
Our paper investigates cheating behavior when experimental partici-
pants are asked to reveal a piece of private information that does not reflect
on their personal ability and where one’s choice does not affect the finan-
cial payoffs of other participants. This information concerns the state of the
world. In the Baseline treatment, there is no financial incentive for misreport-
ing the state of the world and the reports made do not differ significantly from
expected outcomes with random draws. On the other hand, reports when
there are financial incentives to cheat generally show considerable evidence
of lying on the reports made. In addition, we study cheating in the absence
of payoff externalities, in that only one’s own material payoff is affected by
reported outcome.
We do not find evidence that loss aversion translates into this environ-
ment. There is no difference in behavior across gain and loss frames when
payment is simply made at the end of the session. More remarkably, when we
endow participants with prospective payment in advance, there is substan-
tially less cheating in the loss frame. We presume that the observed behavior
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represents differences in the moral cost of cheating, reflected by either some
form of guilt aversion or a desire to have a favorable self-image or social
image.
Our results represent a challenge for the more standard behavioral the-
ories such as loss aversion and reference points. It seems that the moral
cost of behavior is an element that must not be ignored. We expect more
research will follow on this theme, as it is critical to understanding cheating
and corruption in the world at large.
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Appendix A
In the Results, we use a χ2 test to investigate whether the reported out-
comes differ from the expected ones (i.e., the equal distribution). In the first
columns of Table 3.1 of this Appendix, we show that our results are robust
to the Wilcoxon rank-sum test (Z) and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test of
cumulative distributions, except for the Loss-MM treatment, where the one-
tailed comparisons between the reports and the expected actual outcomes
come close to statistical significance.14
Table 3.1: Non-parametric analysis (Wilcoxon rank-sum and Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests), fraction of cheaters and correlation between reported out-
comes and previous earnings in each treatment
Treatment Z KS % cheaters Correlation
Baseline 1.099 61.810 -0.125
(0.272) (0.405) (0.245)
Gain-NO 04.095*** 14.056*** 62.43% -0.148
(0.000) (0.000) (0.802)
Loss-NO 3.886*** 15.454*** 48.37% -0.028
(0.000) (0.000) (0.802)
Gain-MM 0 3.296*** 12.448*** 60.12% -0.068
(0.001) (0.001) (0.541)
Loss-MM 1.563* 3.459* 21.99% -0.004
(0.059) (0.089) (0.971)
Notes. * and *** indicate significance at the p = 0.10 and p = 0.01 levels,
respectively. p-values are reported in brackets.
14We assume that the number of observations is 85 and perform one-tailed analysis,
except for the Baseline treatment, where we consider a two-tailed hypothesis.
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The literature on cheating behavior has usually identified honest subjects
as those who report the worst possible outcome (Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-
Heusi, 2013). The third column of Table 3.1 reports the fraction of subjects
who cheat to avoid the worst possible outcome (receiving nothing) using the
estimation method in Garbarino, Slonim and Villeval (2016). The last col-
umn of Table 3.1 reports the correlation between the reported outcomes and
the participants’ earnings in the previous experiment. While this is negative
and never significant.
In Table 3.2, we report the results of a Tobit analysis, where the set of
independent variables include dummies for our treatment conditions. The
reported standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the session level.
Table 3.2: : Regression analysis (using the Baseline as the benchmark)
(1)
Pooled data
Constant 5.079***
(0.203)
Gain-NO 1.602***
(0.392)
Loss-NO - 1.541***
(502)
Gain-MM 1.046***
(0.372)
Loss-MM 0.289
(0.241)
Num. observations 426
(uncensored) (332)
Pseudo LL -937.023
Prob > F 0.004
,where the number in parenthesis represent the standard errors for each
coefficient. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In line with our previous analysis, we find that all treatments are sta-
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tistically different from the Baseline (p < 0.01) except for the Loss-MM
treatment (p = 0.231). Pairwise comparisons confirm that there is no sig-
nificant difference between reports in Gain-NO and Loss-NO (p = 0.674),
while there is a significant difference between the reports in the Gain-MM
and Loss-MM treatments (p = 0.016). We also see that there is a significant
difference between the reports in the Loss-NO and Loss-MM treatments (p
= 0.003), while the difference between the reports in the Gain-NO and Gain-
MM treatments is weakly significant (p = 0.062), this suggesting that the
manipulation of money can also have an effect in the Gain treatments in the
expected direction.
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Appendix B: Instructions
Instructions
The aim of this experiment is to study decision-making. We are not
interested in your particular choices but rather on the individual’s average
behavior. Thus, all through the experiment you will be treated anonymously.
Neither the experimenters nor the people in this room will ever know your
particular choices. Please do not think that we expect a particular behav-
ior from you. However, take into account that your decisions along the
experiment may affect your earnings. Below, you will find the experimen-
tal instructions which detail how the experiment unfolds. Please follow them
carefully, as it is important that you understand the experiment before start-
ing. Talking with each other is forbidden during the experiment. If you have
any questions, raise your hand and remain silent. You will be attended by
the instructor as soon as possible.
What is the experiment about?
Baseline treatment:
Your task consists on throwing the 10 sided dice that you received mem-
orizing the number that you obtain in the first throw. This number will
determine your earnings as is shown in the table below.
Number 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Amount e2.5 e2.5 e2.5 e2.5 e2.5 e2.5 e2.5 e2.5 e2.5 e2.5
This means that you will earn e2.5 regardless of the number that you
report.
First, we ask you to roll the dice and memorize the number you obtain
in the first throw.
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Then, introduce this number in the computer screen.
You can throw the dice as many times as you want to test that it works
properly. Still, your payment depends only on the number you report for the
first throw.
At the end of the experiment, you will receive your earnings (in an anony-
mous way) in a sealed envelope.
Gain-NO treatment:
Your task consists on throwing the 10 sided dice that you received mem-
orizing the number that you obtain in the first throw. This number will
determine your earnings as is shown in the table below.
Number 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Amount e0 e1 e1.5 e2 e2.5 e3 e3.5 e4 e4.5 e5
This means that you will earn e0 if the number you report is 0, e1 if the
number you report is 1, e1.5 if the number you report is 2, so on, obtaining
an amount of e5 if you report a 9.
First, we ask you to roll the dice and memorize the number you obtain
in the first throw.
Then, introduce this number in the computer screen.
You can throw the dice as many times as you want to test that it works
properly. Still, your payment depends only on the number you report for the
first throw.
At the end of the experiment, you will receive your earnings (in an anony-
mous way) in a sealed envelope.
Loss-NO treatment:
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Before starting the experiment you received e5. Your task consists on
throwing the 10 sided dice that you received memorizing the number that
you obtain in the first throw. This number will determine your earnings as
is shown in the table below.
Number 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Amount e-5 e-4 e-3.5 e-3 e-2.5 e-2 e-1.5 e-1 e-0.5 e0
This means that you will return e5 if the number you report is 0, e4
if the number you report is 1, e3.5 if the number you report is 2, so on,
returning an amount of e0 if you report a 9.
First, we ask you to roll the dice and memorize the number you obtain
in the first throw.
Then, introduce this number in the computer screen. We shall subtract
the amount that you need to return from your initial e5 You can throw the
dice as many times as you want to test that it works properly, still your
payment depends only on the number you report for the first throw.
At the end of the experiment, you will receive your earnings (in an anony-
mous way) in a sealed envelope.
Gain-MM treatment:
Your task consists on throwing the 10 sided dice that you received mem-
orizing the number that you obtain in the first throw. This number will
determine your earnings as is shown in the table below.
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Number 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Amount e0 e1 e1.5 e2 e2.5 e3 e3.5 e4 e4.5 e5
This means that you will earn e0 if the number you report is 0, e1 if the
number you report is 1, e1.5 if the number you report is 2, so on, obtaining
an amount of e5 if you report a 9.
This means that you will earn e0 if the number you report is 0, e1 if the
number you report is 1, e1.5 if the number you report is 2, so on, obtaining
an amount of e5 if you report a 9.
First, we ask you to roll the dice and memorize the number you obtain
in the first throw.
Then, report this number using the computer screen. There is an enve-
lope with e5 on your table. Take the money that corresponds to your throw
and sealed it.
You can throw the dice as many times as you want to test that it works
properly, still your payment depends only on the number you reported for
the first throw.
At the end of the experiment, the instructor will pick up the sealed en-
velopes when you leave the room. Your earnings will be anonymous.
Loss-MM treatment:
Before starting the experiment you received e5.
Your task consists on throwing the 10 sided dice that you received mem-
orizing the number that you obtain in the first throw. This number will
determine your earnings as is shown in the table below.
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Number 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Amount e-5 e-4 e-3.5 e-3 e-2.5 e-2 e-1.5 e-1 e-0.5 e0
This means that you will return e5 if the number you report is 0, e4
if the number you report is 1, e3.5 if the number you report is 2, so on,
returning an amount of e0 if you report a 9.
First, we ask you to roll the dice and memorize the number you obtain
in the first throw.
Then, introduce this number in the computer screen. Place the amount
that you need to return in the envelope and sealed it.
You can throw the dice as many times as you want to test that it works
properly, still your payment depends only on number obtained on the first
throw.
At the end of the experiment, the instructor will pick up the envelopes. Your
earnings will be anonymous.
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Chapter 4
Distributional Consequences of
Endogenous and Compulsory
Delegation
Abstract
We study endogenous delegation in a dictator game where the principal can
choose whether to delegate or not the allocation decision. Roughly half the
subjects choose to delegate their decision. Our main result is that more
egalitarian distributions occur when it is optional relative to when it is com-
pulsory. This result holds both when principals and agents make the decision
under endogenous delegation. When principals delegate, the allocation out-
comes are similar to those observed under the standard dictator game and
agents allocate more to recipients relative to principals. Finally, principals
in compulsory delegation choose agents that allocate less to recipients, this
relationship is weaker in endogenous delegation.
Introduction
Delegation is a useful tool in organizations for several reasons. It is ar-
gued that delegation is desirable for efficiency reasons, leader formation and
also to pass decision making to outside sources. The experimental literature
has studied delegation in different scenarios such as hierarchical structures
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(Hamman et al. 2010; Bartling and Fischbacher, 2012; Oexl and Grossman,
2013), bargaining scenarios (Ferhrstman and Gneezy, 2001) or labour mar-
kets environments (Charness et al. 2012). One limitation of this literature is
that most studies do not take into account that delegated decisions are often
made by the principal themselves and not exogenously imposed upon them.
In this paper we study the distributional consequences of endogenous
delegation in a dictator game. We find that endogenous delegation gener-
ates more equal distributions than exogenously imposed delegation. Further,
when principals make the allocation decision in endogenous delegation they
transfer less to recipients (an average of 3.14) than when agents decide (3.83).
Delegation in hierarchical structures has been studied in experimental
literature by Hamman et al. (2010), Bartling and Fischbacher (2012) and
Oexl and Grossman (2013). The results from these experiments point to-
wards delegation being used as a tool to hide behind unfair decisions. Ham-
man et al. (2010) find that under compulsory delegation the amounts redis-
tributed to recipients are lower than in the standard dictator game. Hamman
et al. (2010) also run experiments with endogenous delegation. Subjects first
play 8 periods of compulsory delegation and then, 4 periods of endogenous
delegation. They find that subjects in endogenous delegation behave sim-
ilarly to subjects in compulsory delegation. We have also replicated this
treatment and obtain the same results. It seems that once principals and
agents become used to a lower social norm they carry it onto the endogenous
delegation part. Subjects who first play compulsory and then endogenous
delegation were affected by the previous periods and the learning they ob-
tained from it. Meanwhile, Bartling and Fischbacher (2012) and Oexl and
Grossman (2013) use a four player dictator game with one principal, one
agent and two recipients, one of which will be able to punish the rest of the
players after the division of the endowment has been made. Endowment can
only be divided in two ways: unfair or fair. They find that delegation is ef-
fective at avoiding principals being held responsible for the unfair decision as
recipients also punish agents for unfair decisions that have been delegated by
the principal. The main results from this literature is that the distribution
is less egalitarian when delegation is implemented. Overall, agents favor the
principal’s and transfer less to the recipients.
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Hamman et al. (2010) studied exogenously imposed delegation upon the
principals and found that principals select agents that maximize their pay-
offs and consequently reallocate lower amounts to recipients. By requiring
compulsory delegation they remove principals from the decision to delegate
or not. They find that when removed from this decision, principals select
agents that maximize their payoffs. We ask the question what happens when
delegation decisions are endogenous in the dictator game. We first repli-
cate the results of Hamman et al. (2010). We obtain qualitatively the same
results. Subjects redistribute less under compulsory delegation than under
the standard dictator game. We then allow the delegation decision to be
endogenous, where principals can choose to delegate the decision or decide
themselves. A priori one would expect that those who delegate, i.e. ‘pass on
the responsibility of the decision’, will behave in a selfish manner and choose
agents who reallocate lower amounts to recipients (Hamman et al. 2010).
The motives of those that choose not to delegate are not clear. It could be
that they prefer to make the decision on their own for either the prosocial
or selfish motive. We find that endogenous delegation always generates more
egalitarian distributions relative to compulsory delegation. Surprisingly, the
distribution made by agents under endogenous delegation converges to the
one observed under the standard dictator game.
We find that agents redistribute higher amounts than principals un-
der endogenous delegation which goes against the results observed under
compulsory delegation. One possible explanation for this result concerns the
agents beliefs on the principals behaviour. Previous literature states that the
knowledge of having an extra competitor (the principal), may affect agents
behaviour and result in lower competition (Garcia and Tor, 2009). We mit-
igate this effect by running two further endogenous delegation treatments:
one where agents know that the principal can delegate to them or make the
decision themselves and another (informationally closer to compulsory dele-
gation) in which agents do not know that there is an alternative to choosing
an agent. That is, they are only informed that the principal chooses to dele-
gate or not. We find no differences between these two endogenous delegation
treatments. We can thus conclude that agents behaviour could not be only
explained by differences in information.
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Another way to reconcile our results is by arguing that social distance
(Hoffman et al. 1996) under endogenous and compulsory delegation is differ-
ent. That is, under delegation the social distance is greater than under no-
delegation. This implies that compulsory delegation favours selfish behaviour
whereas, endogenous delegation will favour more ‘pro-social’ behaviour. Sim-
ilarly, using the ‘responsibility hypothesis’ (Charness, 2000), one can say that
the principals may feel more responsible over the outcome in endogenous del-
egation where they can make the decision themselves effectively avoiding an
unfair distribution. However, both responsibility and social distance cannot
fully reconcile our results either. We are unable to explain why the alloca-
tions are lower when pricipals choose to make the allocation decision on their
own.
Literature Review
Previous literature has used the well-known dictator game (Forsythe et
al., 1994) to study the distributional consequences of delegation (Hamman
et al. 2010; Bartling and Fischbacher, 2012; Oexl and Grossman, 2013). The
main result from this literature is that compulsory delegation results in less
equalitarian outcomes than the standard dictator game. Others have studied
delegation using the ultimatum game bargaining situation (Fershtman and
Gneezy, 2001) and labor markets environment (Fehr et al. 2010; Charness et
al. 2012 and Maximiano et al. 2013). Bargaining literature finds that dele-
gation is a way of increasing the proposers share only if delegation is forced.
Meanwhile in labour markets delegation can be used to make workers feel
more attached to the company as workers on which principals delegate, are
more likely to provide higher effort levels.
Dictator games have been extensively studied in experiments. The main
results from a meta-study of more than 120 studies (see Engel, 2010) is that
the average amounts redistributed to recipients represent the 28% of the total
pie.1 Some studies have suggested that these amounts may increase if social
1Similar average amounts are obtained by Camerer (2003) who analysed the data of
11 studies and by Cardenas and Carpenter (2008) who perform a similar analysis with
dictator games conducted in developing counties.
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distance between principals and recipients decreases by identifying principals
by their surname (Charness and Gneezy, 2008) or making principals feel that
anonymity is not ensured (Hoffman et al. 1996). Furthermore, framing effects
also vary the amounts transferred to recipients. Branas-Garza (2007) finds
that emphasizing the dictators’ responsibility over the outcome increases dic-
tators’ generosity by adding to the dictator’s instructions the sentence “Note
that he relies in you”. Meanwhile, List (2007) finds that framing affects the
outcome of a dictator game. In one treatment, principals were asked to split
the endowment while on the other, they were asked to “take” money from
recipients. This change in framing affected the outcome as principals trans-
ferred less money to recipients when they were in the “take” treatment.
Hamman et al. (2010) introduce a variant of the dictator game where
principals delegate to agents and find that agents who share less with recip-
ients are selected more often. This is in line with their claim that delegation
is a tool used by principals to hide behind agents when unfair decisions
have to be taken. The dictator game has also been used to study the effect
of agents or principals being punished by their actions. Bartling and Fis-
chbacher (2012) use groups of one dictator, one agent and two recipients and
give one of the recipients the power to punish other players for their actions.
They obtain that punishers use their power on both dictators and agents
only when the outcome is unfair. Oexl and Grossman (2013) further ex-
tend Bartling and Fischbacher (2012) and find that delegation is effective in
shifting the blame from principals to agents. Coffman (2011) also finds that
intermediation reduces principal’s punishment when the punishers payoff is
independent of the principals actions, delegation is a useful mechanism when
one wants to shift the blame for taking unfair decisions. On one side, the
principal shifts the blame by making the agent decide, while the agent feels
that it is the principal that pushes towards the unfair outcome. Garofalo
and Rott (2017), also find that recipients punish both principal and agent
for unfair decisions when the agents’ only role is to communicate the deci-
sion made by the principal. Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) use an ultimatum
game in which proposers can delegate the offer made to the recipient to an
external agent. They find that when delegation is chosen the payoffs of the
proposers increase. Choy et al. (2015) also use the ultimatum game to com-
pare exogenous and endogenous delegation in a bargaining environment and
find that unfair outcomes are more likely under endogenous delegation than
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under compulsory delegation. They also find a difference between endoge-
nous and exogenous delegation. Overall there is a common theme in all these
papers, delegation increases payoffs of the proposer/sender under delegation.
There are other papers that have studied the joint effect of delegation
and other factors such as dishonesty, corruption, information, gender2 or
bargaining. Erat (2013) and Sutan and Vranceanu (2015) examined dishon-
esty in environments with endogenous delegation of decisions. Sutan and
Vranceanu (2015) use a dictator game in which proposers can lie about dele-
gating to a third party. They find that imperfect information3 increases the
proposers profit by shifting its blame.4 Similarly, Erat (2013) showed that
agents are more frequently hired when they have to lie in a sender-receiver
game.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 describes our
experimental design in detail. Section 4 presents our main results. Section 5
concludes.
2Bottino et al. (2016) show that in a compulsory delegation treatment female and male
principals behave similarly while as agents’ females show greater redistributive concerns
relative to their male counterparts even though it is detrimental to them as they are
selected less often.
3Lai and Lim (2012) study the effect of information and communication on delegation
(without cheating option) and find that generally principals under-delegate even when is
more profitable to do so. Furthermore, Cettolin and Riedl (2010), use delegation to prove
that under uncertainty there is a violation of rationality in decisions.
4On this line, Jacquemet (2005) and Drugov et al. (2014) examine how intermediaries
increase corruption by diminishing the moral cost of being corrupt by effectively shifting
the blame of being corrupt.
5Surprisingly dishonesty on the sender-receiver game with agent is prevalent even when
the identities of cheaters are revealed to other players (Van de Ven and Villeval, 2015).
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Experimental Design
A total of 236 subjects were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) to par-
ticipate in the experiment at Middlesex University London6. Each subject
participated in only one treatment. The experiment lasted for approximately
45 minutes and subjects earned on average £12. We conducted a total of 26
sessions (see Table 4.1 for a summary of the experimental design).
The experiment consisted of four treatments and three main conditions.
Upon arrival participants were randomly allocated seats, read the instruc-
tions and were informed of their roles in the experiment. In the baseline
treatment 10 or 8 subjects played a dictator game for 12 rounds.7 Half of
the players were recipients and half principals. The delegation treatments
included also two subjects in the role of agent. Therefore there were three
possible roles: principal (player P), agent (player A) and recipient (player
R).8
We have a total of four treatments and three different delegation mech-
anisms (See Figure 4.1). Treatments:
• Baseline (BS)
The BS treatment is the standard dictator game. In each session half
of the subjects are assigned the role of principal and the other half
the role of recipient. In each round, principals are told that they have
to divide an endowment of £10 between themselves and a randomly
matched recipient. Principals are informed that they will be matched
with different recipients in each round. The treatment had 40 partici-
pants playing in 4 sessions.
6Instructions can be found in Appendix D.
7The group size depended upon show up.
8To avoid framing, in the instructions we referred to the the participants as “A”, “B”
and “C” instead of “principal”, “recipient” and “agent” respectively.
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• Endogenous Delegation (ED-1)9.
In this treatment we introduce a third player, the agent (A). Principals
can choose one of the two available agents (A1 or A2) or to make the
decision of dividing £10 themselves. If the principal selects one of the
two agents, this agent will then divide the endowment between prin-
cipal and recipient. This treatment had 96 participants and 11 sessions.
In this treatment we explicitly inform the agents that principals can
delegate or make the decision themselves. Agents thus know that
they are competing among themselves and the principal. Compared
to compulsory delegation agents have an extra competitor, the prin-
cipal. The knowledge of this extra competitor, at the same time the
decision maker, may generate beliefs (of agents) on the principals af-
fecting agents behavior and resulting in diminished competition (Gar-
cia and Tor, 2009). We thus ran a third treatment where we made
the ED treatment informationally closer to the CD experiments. That
is, we only inform the agents that the “principal makes the decision
to delegate to either one of them”. Informationally, this treatment lies
between CD and ED-1. This is the treatment below: ED-2.
• Endogenous Delegation without Information (ED-2)
In ED-1 agents knew that compared to compulsory delegation, they had
an extra competitor, the principal. In ED-2 agents do not know that
principals can divide the £10 themselves (see instructions in Appendix
D). This new treatment is created in order to see if the knowledge of
having an extra competitor, affects agents behaviour. We had 56 par-
ticipants playing in 6 different sessions.
9Following Hamman et al (2010) we also performed a treatment in which subjects
participate in a CD treatment for 6 rounds and ED-1 during the last 6 rounds. We
replicated this treatment for consistency reasons. Our results replicate those of Hamman
et al. (2010) where they observe that the behaviour in CD and ED rounds is similar. In
both cases the amounts given to the recipient are low and decrease over time. The results
of this treatment are in Appendix C.
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• Compulsory Delegation (CD)
In this treatment we replicate Hamman et al. (2010). Delegation is
compulsory and therefore the principal has to select an agent to divide
the endowment. Each session has two agents: A1 and A2. The prin-
cipals select one of the two agents to divide the endowment in each
round.10 We run 5 sessions with a total 44 participants.
Our payment scheme for all the treatments is a variation of the one in
Hamman et al. (2010).11 Both principal and recipient were paid in cash for
one randomly selected round drawn at the end of the experiment. Agents
were paid differently. In addition to the £5 show-up fee they obtain an
additional £5 at the beginning of the experiment, starting capital. Their
experimental payment was calculated as follows:
pii = −0.30 + 0.15ni
Where, 0.30 represents the fixed costs that agents face in each period
regardless of them being selected by any principal. ni is the number of prin-
cipals choosing agent i. In addition to the experimental earnings, all subjects
were paid a £5 show-up fee plus £2 for completing a series of questionnaires
after the experiment. At the end of the experiment each participant re-
ceived a sealed envelope with their identification number and the amount
they earned.
10In Hamman et al. (2010), principals were randomly allocated to an agent at the
beginning of period 1, introducing the possibility of choosing one agent or the other from
round 2 on. This study will differ as principals choose an agent on every possible round,
including round 1. We chose not to impose one round of compulsory delegation before
making delegation optional in order to avoid any effect from the initial round.
11We modified the coefficients of the payment equation to adapt it to the amount of
players that we had per session.
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Table 4.1: Summary of the experimental design
Baseline Endogenous Endogenous Compulsory
Delegation Delegation Delegation
(BS) (ED-1) (ED-2) (CD)
Divides the endowment Principal Principal Principal —
— Agent Agent Agent
Sessions 4 11 6 5
Number of subjects 40 96 56 44
Principals/Agents 20/-/20 37/22/37 22/12/22 17/10/17
/Recipients
Figure 4.1: Summary of the experimental design.
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Previous literature finds that allocations under delegation favour the
principal (Hamman et al. 2010; Bartling and Fischbacher, 2012; Oexl and
Grossman, 2013) and that principals select agents that maximize their pay-
offs (Hamman et al. 2010; Bottino et al. 2016). Based on this our main
hypotheses are:
• Hypothesis 1: Amounts allocated to recipients will be lower under
delegation than under no-delegation.
• Hypothesis 2: Under endogenous delegation allocation to recipients
will be lower when principals delegate compared to when they make the
allocation decision themselves.
• Hypothesis 3: Agents making allocation decisions favourable to the
principal will be selected more often under delegation.
Results
Overall we find that ED-1 and ED-2 treatments give us the same results
(see Appendix A for a more accurate comparison between these two treat-
ments) regarding the amount redistributed to recipients, the proportion of
decisions delegated and the behaviour of agents. We decided to pool the re-
sults of these two treatments. From now on we will refer to this data simply
as ED. Further, we refer to those who delegate under ED as ED-D and those
who do not as ED-N.
Hypothesis 1 predicts that amounts allocated to recipients will be lower
under delegation. Figure 4.2 shows the amount transferred to recipients by
round in each of the treatments: BS, CD and the two choices of delegation
that the principals have in ED: ED-D and ED-N. We see that BS follows
a very similar pattern as ED-D. A Mann-Whitney (rank-sum) test of dis-
tributions12 confirms that the populations of BS and ED-D follow the same
distribution (z=0.000, p=0.99). Meanwhile ED-N does not follow the same
distribution as BS (z=2.811, p=0.00) and ED-D (z=-3.252, p=0.00). When
12From now on we use Mann-Whitney non-parametric tests to study the hypothesis that
two independent samples are from populations with the same distribution.
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principals make the allocation decision in ED-N, they allocate lower amounts
to recipients. Still, the amounts allocated in ED-N are significantly higher
than the amounts allocated in compulsory delegation (z=-2.550, p=0.01).13
14 This means that the amounts redistributed in CD are lower than in the
other treatments. The results of ED-D therefore contradict Hypothesis 1.15
This gives us Result 1.
13The amounts allocated to recipients are also higher in BS than in CD (z=6.029,
p=0.00).
14A quantile regression analysis with the amount allocated as a dependent variable and
all the treatment dummies (but CD) as independent variables gives us that all the coeffi-
cients are significant and with positive values BS: 2.18, ED-D: 1.23, ED-N:1.18. Therefore,
higher amounts are allocated in all the treatments compared to CD.
15Notice that we can check for how the distribution changes across the periods and treat-
ments using the Gini index, a measure of inequality. We obtain that the Gini coefficient
has a higher value in CD (0.44) than in BS (0.29), ED-N (0.30) or ED-D (0.16) where
the Gini coefficient is the smallest. This shows that, CD generates more inequality than
the other two treatments. This is interesting as it points out that removal from decision
making is not always detrimental to income equality.
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Figure 4.2: Amounts earned by the recipient by round and treatment
Result 1
• a: Amount allocated to recipients is higher when principals choose to
delegate than when they make the allocation decision themselves.
• b: Allocations made by agents under endogenous delegation converge
to the one made by principals in the standard dictator game.
• c: Under compulsory delegation recipients earn significantly less than
in the baseline and either endogenous delegation treatments.
Hypothesis 2 states lower redistribution when agents are selected un-
der endogenous delegation. In Table 4.2 we find that delegation occurs in
roughly the 50% of the cases.16 Surprisingly, the average amount allocated
16Figure 4.1 in Appendix B, shows a histogram dividing the principals by number of
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to the recipient by principals (3.14) is significantly lower than the allocation
made by agents (3.83).17 Given the results from previous literature this is
unexpected. We find that agents allocate more to recipients than principals
when we expected the opposite. Compared to CD, where agents compete by
giving lower amounts to recipients, the situation seems to change when ED
is implemented. This contradicts Hypothesis 2 and gives us Result 2.1819
• Result 2: Delegating does not result in more unfair distributions under
endogenous delegation. In fact, agents reallocate higher amounts to
recipients than principals.
Table 4.2: Percentage of delegated decisions and corresponding amount re-
distributed per group of rounds.
Rounds Proportion of delegated Average amount allocated
decisions
Agent Principal
(1-4) 49% 4.31 3.91
(5-8) 52% 3.66 2.97
(9-12) 53% 3.5 2.60
times that they decided not to delegate. We observe that the distribution is very close
to a normal distribution and that subjects choose to delegate in roughly half of the cases
(5.98 is the mean amount of times that one subject does not delegate).
17A Mann- Whitney test confirms that the amounts transferred to the recipient in ED-D
and ED-N treatments are statistically different over time (z=3.252 p=0.00).
18Figure 4.2 in Appendix B, shows that there is not a clear tendency regarding the
average amount allocated to the recipient by number of times that a person decides not
to delegate in the ED treatment. A t-test, however confirms that the average amount
transferred by people who delegate in more than half of the rounds is statistically different
from the quantity transferred by those who choose to delegate in less than half of the
rounds (t= 2.914, p=0.00). Principals who delegate more earn more.
19We ruled out potential informational asymmetries affecting our results by running
ED-1 and ED-2 and obtaining the same results.
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Now, we focus our attention on Hypothesis 3. It predicts that agents
making decisions favourable to the principal are selected more often. To
check this we investigate agent behaviour in the delegation treatments. We
find that the average shared amount by agents that are not chosen by princi-
pals in the next round in CD is 3.88. This is well above the average amount
shared by those who are selected again, 1.81. Under ED principals seem to
react less to lower amounts. Principal’s switch the decision maker when the
amount allocated is on average 3.47 and they do not change their delegation
strategy when the amount is 2.86 (the difference is lower but still significant
t=-2.320, p=0.02). Moreover, principals switch the decision maker more of-
ten in ED (52%) than in CD (36%).20 Notice that in ED they also have more
alternatives when they decide to switch the decision maker.
To better understand the mechanism by which agents are chosen by
principals we performed a series of logistic regressions (clustered by subject)
for CD and ED treatments (Table 4.3).21 Model 1 and Model 2 analyse the
CD data, their dependent variable is a dummy with value one if the principal
decides to switch agents after that round and zero otherwise. In Models 3,
4, 5, 6 the data examined is from ED. Model 3 and 4 have as dependent
variable a dummy with value one if principals switch from delegating to not
delegating and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in Model 5 and 6 is
a dummy with value one if the agent changes the decision maker in any way
(from agents to principal, principal to agents or from one agent to another)
from one round to another, and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables
are the same for all the models: the amount allocated to recipients on the
previous period and the rounds (only on models 2, 4 and 6).
20Figures 3 and 4 in Appendix B present the proportion of switching in decision maker
under ED and CD over time. Switching decreases over time.
21Since the dependent variables are always categorical we use logistic regressions. We
also excluded the last round from the regressions to avoid the end game effect.
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Table 4.3: Switching in round t based in round t-1
CD ED
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Amount allocated 0.28*** 0.29*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.13*** 0.13***
to recipients on (0.08) (0.08) (0.03) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
theprevious round
Round 0.05 -0.01 -0.02
(0.04) (0.23) (0.23)
Constant -1.29*** -1.63*** -1.13*** -1.08*** -0.32*** -0.15***
(0.32) (0.50) (0.19) (0.26) (0.21) (0.24)
Observations 187 187 649 649 649 649
(17) (17) (59) (59) (59) (59)
Log likelihood -99.46 -110.57 -395.88 -395.84 434.28 -433.65
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00
, where the number in parenthesis represent the standard errors for each
coefficient. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
In Models 1 and 2 the variable amount allocated to recipients in the
previous round is positive and significant (0.28 and 0.29 respectively) at a
1% level. This indicates that in CD principals switch agents in a round
when the previously selected agent allocated higher amounts to the recipi-
ent. Agents that are selected are those allocating lower amounts to recipients.
Models 3 and 4 provide us a lower coefficient associated with the amount
given in previous periods by agents (0.08), this coefficient is also significant
at a 1% level. Principals in this case, switch from delegating to not dele-
gating when the amount allocated in the previous round is low. Meanwhile,
Models 5 and 6 indicate that in ED higher amounts allocated to the recipi-
86
ent mean a higher likelihood of a change in strategy in the next round. Note
that the size of the coefficient associated with the amount transferred (0.13)
is smaller than in the CD treatment. In ED principals still switch due to
higher amounts redistributed, but the effect is considerably smaller than in
CD. The coefficient associated with the round is never significant.
This result is in line with the previous literature (Hamman et al. 2010;
Bartling and Fischbacher, 2012) where they argue that principals select those
agents who share less with recipients. Regardless, the coefficients associated
with the amount shared are smaller for ED regressions than for CD. Under
CD principals are more prone to switch agents if the amount earned is small,
this hints that competition between agents in CD is greater than under ED.
It is not clear why this occurs. One potential explanation is that agents
in CD understand that principals switch agents when they transfer more to
recipients and thus start transferring lower amounts each round. Under ED
this is not the case. Principals also switch their strategy when they get lower
amounts, but in a more moderate way. Agents do not seem to realize about
the relationship between lower amounts and switching strategy in ED and
therefore do not use allocating lower amounts to recipients as a strategy to
be selected by agents over time.22 This gives us Result 3:
• Result 3: In endogenous delegation, principals switch agents when they
allocate higher amounts to recipients, however, this reaction is small
and as a result agents do not reallocate lower amounts to recipients.
Under compulsory delegation principals select those agents transferring
less to recipients and the effect is bigger than in endogenous delegation.
Conclusions
The main results from this paper is that endogenous delegation does not
increase inequality between principals and recipients. A priori we expected
that when agents made the decision (delegation), the allocation to recipients
22When we analyse the data from agents perspective we also find a clear relationship
between higher profits for agents and lower amounts reallocated to recipients in CD. We
do not find this in ED. See Table 4.2 in Appendix B for a detailed analysis of agents
behaviour.
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would be lower than when principals decided (no delegation). Surprisingly,
agents in endogenous delegation are the ones allocating higher amounts to
recipients. This contradicts previous literature and our results under com-
pulsory delegation that find that principal’s act as profit maximizers and
tend to select agents who share lower amounts with recipients.
Clearly there is a behavioural difference of agents behaviour both in com-
pulsory and endogenous delegation treatments. This could be explained by
the endogenous mechanism or by the different information structures of both
games. In compulsory delegation agents were competing among themselves
while in endogenous delegation the principal could choose not to delegate.
This may generate beliefs (of agents) on the principals. A priori this sug-
gests that competition for agents is greater under endogenous delegation.
We ruled out any possible information effect that could explain this results
implementing two different endogenous delegation treatments, one with in-
formation on principals possible choices and another on which agents did
not know that they were also competing with the principal (information-
ally closer to compulsory delegation). The results of these two treatments
are identical suggesting that information asymmetries were not affecting the
choices of principals and agents.
Previous literature has mainly focused on compulsory delegation (Ham-
man et al. 2010) finding that principal’s act as profit maximizers under
this structure opposed to their behaviour on a simple dictator game where
they tend to show a more altruistic behaviour with recipients. Both baseline
(dictator game) and compulsory delegation treatments’ results are consistent
with this existing literature.
As earlier mentioned, one can partly reconcile our results with earlier
outcomes by appealing to the social distance (Hoffman et al. 1996). Under
compulsory delegation an agent is imposed, increasing the social distance
with respect to the standard dictator game. This results in prosocial motives
being removed and lower quantities being reallocated to recipients. How-
ever in endogenous delegation social distance is weaker as the principal can
choose not to delegate. This results in higher redistribution. Along a sim-
ilar line, another explanation could be the role of responsibility (Charness,
2000). The responsibility of the decision lies in the principal more under en-
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dogenous delegation as the principal can actively avoid unfair situations. In
addition, previous studies (Dana et al. 2006; Dana et al. 2007; Andreoni and
Bernheim, 2009; Grossman 2014) find that subjects do not always want to
face the outcome of an unfair decision. In compulsory delegation principals
do not directly choose the unfair outcome and therefore they do not directly
have to face the earnings of the recipient (even if they can easily calculate
them) and this affects them feeling less responsible over it.
Both, social distance and responsibility hypothesis, would imply lower
allocations to the receivers when one delegates. However, under endogenous
delegation, allocations are lower when the principal chooses not to delegate
where implied social distance is lower. The explanation then has to lie in
the fact that in our scenario delegation may not be a test for passing the
responsibility for bad decisions. We are further running experiments under
different frameworks where we address this directly.
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Appendix A
Figure 4.1: Amounts earned by the recipient by round when they delegate
and not in ED-1 and ED-2 treatments
Overall we find that ED-1 and ED-2 give us the same results. The
average shared amount with recipients in ED-1 is 3.47, not statistically sig-
nificantly different from the average transferred amount in ED-2 , 3.49 (z=
0.731, p= 0.464 in a Mann-Whitney test).
In both treatments roughly half of the decisions were delegated, hinting
that principals’ behavior did not change either. Moreover, as we can see in
Figure 4.1, in both treatments selected agents reallocated higher amounts to
recipients than principals, ED-1: 3.28 if they do not delegate, 3.70 when they
delegate (z=1.273, p=0.20); ED-2: 2.89 when they do not delegate, 4 when
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they delegate (z=3.866, p=0.01). We thus conclude that the information in
the experiment does not matter in terms of outcomes. Given this we pool
the data from these two treatments. Henceforth this pooled data is referred
to as ED.
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Appendix B
Figure 4.1: Number of times that each principal chooses not to delegate.
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Figure 4.2: Average amounts transferred to the recipient by number of times
that the subject decided not to delegate.
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Figure 4.3: Percentage switching from one decision maker to another by
round in CD.
96
Figure 4.4: Percentage switching from one decision maker to another by
round in ED.
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Table 4.1: Answers to the questionnaire
BS CD ED
Player P R P R A P R A
I feel involved 1.85 -0.78 0.17 -0.82 0.88 1.30 -0.43 -0.27
in this experiment (0.12) (0.14) (0.15) (0.13) (0.21) (0.06) (0.10) (0.11)
Total profit obtained 1.11 0.68 1.57 0.05 0 1.22 0.91 0.03
was relevant for me (0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.33) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09)
I consider my 2.25 2.68 2.64 1.82 2.87 1.66 2.32 1.64
behaviour acceptable (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
Players P with
which I interacted —- 0.10 — -0.23 0.70 — 0.56 0.44
had an acceptable (0.12) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
behaviour
Players A with
which I interacted —- — 1.86 — — 1.05 — —
had an acceptable (0.07) (0.05)
behaviour
I am ready 1.46 1.73 1.94 1.76 2.30 1.35 1.89 1.87
to take risks (0.09) (0.8) (0.07) (0.05) (0.10) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
Note: Average values of the answers to a seven item scale questionnaire, form strongly disagree (-3) to
strongly agree (+3) with a neutral option (0). Standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 4.2 presents two regressions using the data from agents. The de-
pendent variable will be the average allocation made by agents a round while
the set of independent variables will include if the agent sees that he has been
less chosen and therefore earned less profit (profit) and the round they are
in. Generalized least squares regressions with cluster-robust standard errors
are used as estimation method. In Model 1, the data analysed is CD and in
Model 2 ED.
There is a clear relationship between higher profits for agents and lower
amounts reallocated to recipients in CD as the coefficient associated to agents
profit is negative and significant. We do not find this in ED as the coefficient
associated to profits is not significant.
Table 4.2: Amounts reallocated by agents depending on the profit obtained
by them per round
CD ED
Model 1 Model 2
Profit -3.97* -0.16
(0.05) (0.48)
Round -0.06 -0.09**
(0.39) (0.04)
Constant 3.09*** 4.25***
(0.00) (0.31)
Observed agents 10 34
Prob > chi2 0.01 0.23
,where the number in parenthesis represent the standard errors for each
coefficient. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix C:
Compulsory and Endogenous delegation extra treatment. This graph
presents the results of a 6 round CD and 6 rounds ED treatment. The
treatment had 70 participants playing in 5 different sessions. We obtain the
same results as in Hamman et al. (2010), where the outcome of ED after
some rounds of CD converge to CD.
Figure 4.1: Average amounts transferred to the recipient by round in CD-ED
extra treatment
Notice that subjects played CD from round 1-6 and ED from round 7-12.
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Appendix D: Instructions
Treatment 1: Baseline (BS)
Thanks for participating in the experiment!
Please remember that from this moment on and till the end of the exper-
iment no communication is permitted. If you have a question at any moment
please raise your hand and we will answer your question in private.
All identities in this experiment are anonymous. No one in the exper-
iment will get to know your identity during or after the experiment. Your
identity will only be used to ensure that you are paid correctly. Please read
the instructions with care. After reading them and before starting the game
we will provide each participant with a graphical example of the experiment.
You will be paid at the end of the experiment. During the experiment
we will use the term experimental money (EM) to refer to your earnings. At
the end of the experiment we will transform this amount in the local currency
using an exchange rate of 1. Notice that we will add 5 EM show up fee to
your experimental earnings. Your earnings are your private information.
Experiment:
The experiment has twelve periods. The structure of the experiment is
the following.
There are two types of players in this experiment: player A and player
B.
At the start of the experiment you will be assigned a personal identi-
fication number by the computer. Whether you will be Player A or B is
determined (randomly) by the computer.
In each period, each player A is randomly paired with a player B. Each
pair, A-B, will be assigned 10 EM. We will now explain the structure of the
game.
Each period:
At the start of each period, player A decides how to allocate 10 EM to
player B and herself. The allocations can be made in increments of 1 cent of
EM. The amount of 10 EM will be fully allocated between players A and B.
That is, the amount assigned to player B plus the amount player A decides
to keep will always add to 10 EM.
Once player A has taken their decision, each player will be informed
about the amount they have been assigned.
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At the end of each period all players, A and B, will see the information
regarding current and previous periods, the identification numbers of their
pairings and the amount assigned to them in each period.
Payment:
Besides the 5 EM show up fees, each participant will be paid in the
following manner.
At the end of the experiment one of the periods will be randomly chosen
for each player A and B. Each player will be paid the amount they earned in
that period. In addition, subjects will earn 2 EM for completing two short
questionnaires
You will be called individually at the end of the experiment to be paid.
You will inform the experimenter about you ID number and will be paid
accordingly.
Any questions?
Treatment 2: Endogenous Delegation (ED-1 )
Thanks for participating in the experiment!
Please remember that from this moment on and till the end of the exper-
iment no communication is permitted. If you have a question at any moment
please raise your hand and we will answer your question in private.
All identities in this experiment are anonymous. No one in the exper-
iment will get to know your identity during or after the experiment. Your
identity will only be used to ensure that you are paid correctly. Please read
the instructions with care. After reading them and before starting the game
we will provide each participant with a graphical example of the experiment.
You will be paid at the end of the experiment. During the experiment
we will use the term experimental money (EM) to refer to your earnings. At
the end of the experiment we will transform this amount in your currency
using an exchange rate of 1. Notice that we will add 5 EM show up fees to
your experimental earnings. Your earnings are your private information.
Experiment:
The experiment has twelve periods. The structure of the experiment is
the following.
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There are three types of players in this experiment: player A, player B
and player C.
At the start of the experiment you will be assigned a personal identifica-
tion number by the computer. The computer will also inform you regarding
the type of player you have been chosen to be.
In each period, each player A is randomly paired with a player B. There
will also be two C players.
At the start of the period 10 EM will be assigned to each pairing (A-B).
We will now explain the structure of the experiment.
Each period:
Player A’s screen will show two boxes. Each box contains one of the two
Players C and the option Myself.
Each player A has to select if the decision of dividing the experimental
money is taken by one of the two C players or by player A (option Myself).
To select an option,Player A simply needs to click on the associated box.
If A chooses player C, then player C decides how to divide the 10 EM
between each pair of players A and B. The allocations can be made in in-
crements of 1 cent. The amount of 10 EM will be fully allocated between
players A and B. That is, the amount assigned to player B and player A
always adds to 10 EM.
The allocation made by player C to a pair (A,B) is independent of the
allocation made to another pair (if player C has been chosen by more than
one player). If a player C has not been chosen by any player (A) then their
screen will show a waiting message.
If Player A chooses the option Myself, the division of the money will be
done by A.
Once all players have made their decisions, each player A and B will
then be informed about the amount they have been assigned. In addition,
all players will see a table containing all the information regarding previous
periods. Once all players A have made their decisions, player C is informed
about the number of players A who have chosen him. Each decision maker
(A or C) decides how to allocate 10 EM between players A and B. The
allocations can be made in increments of 1 cent. The amount of 10 EM will
be fully allocated between players A and B. That is, the amount assigned to
player B and player A always add to 10 EM.
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Payment:
Besides the 5 EM show up fees, each participant will be paid in the
following manner.
At the end of the experiment one of the periods will be randomly chosen
for each player A and B. Each player will be paid the amount they earned
for that period. That is, this will be the amount that was allocated to them
by player C in that period.
At the start of the experiment each player C is given an additional
quantity of 5 EM However, player C loses 0.30 EM in each period and earns
0.15 EM for each player that selects him. Player C’s earnings are the total
sum of the earnings in the entire experiment.
You will be individually called at the end of the experiment to be paid.
You will inform the experimenter about you ID number and you will be paid
accordingly.
Any questions?
Treatment 3: Endogenous Delegation without Information (ED-2)
Thanks for participating in the experiment!
Please remember that from this moment on and till the end of the exper-
iment no communication is permitted. If you have a question at any moment
please raise your hand and we will answer your question in private.
All identities in this experiment are anonymous. No one in the exper-
iment will get to know your identity during or after the experiment. Your
identity will only be used to ensure that you are paid correctly. Please read
the instructions with care. After reading them and before starting the game
we will provide each participant with a graphical example of the experiment.
You will be paid at the end of the experiment. During the experiment
we will use the term experimental money (EM) to refer to your earnings. At
the end of the experiment we will transform this amount in your currency
using an exchange rate of 1. Notice that we will add 5 EM show up fees to
your experimental earnings. Your earnings are your private information.
Experiment:
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The experiment has twelve periods. The structure of the experiment is
the following.
There are three types of players in this experiment: player A, player B
and player C.
At the start of the experiment you will be assigned a personal identifica-
tion number by the computer. The computer will also inform you regarding
the type of player you have been chosen to be.
In each period, each player A is randomly paired with a player B. There
will also be two C players.
At the start of the period 10 EM will be assigned to each pairing (A-B).
We will now explain the structure of the experiment.
Each period:
Each player A has to decide to delegate or not the decision of dividing
the endowment on one of the two C players. To select an option, Player A
simply needs to click on the associated box.
If A chooses a player C, then player C decides how to divide the 10
EM between each pair of players A and B. The allocations can be made in
increments of 1 cent. The amount of 10 EM will be fully allocated between
players A and B. That is, the amount assigned to player B and player A
always adds to 10 EM.
The allocation made by player C to a pair (A, B) is independent of the
allocation made to another pair (if player C has been chosen by more than
one player). If a player C has not been chosen by any player (A) then their
screen will show a waiting message.
Once all players have made their decisions, each player A and B will
then be informed about the amount they have been assigned. In addition,
all players will see a table containing all the information regarding previous
periods. Once all players A have made their decisions, player C is informed
about the number of players A who have chosen him. Each decision maker
(A or C) decides how to allocate 10 EM between players A and B. The
allocations can be made in increments of 1 cent. The amount of 10 EM will
be fully allocated between players A and B. That is, the amount assigned to
player B and player A always add to 10 EM.
Payment:
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Besides the 5 EM show up fees, each participant will be paid in the
following manner.
At the end of the experiment one of the periods will be randomly chosen
for each player A and B. Each player will be paid the amount they earned
for that period. That is, this will be the amount that was allocated to them
by player C in that period.
At the start of the experiment each player C is given an additional
quantity of 5 EM However, player C loses 0.30 EM in each period and earns
0.15 EM for each player that selects him. Player C’s earnings are the total
sum of the earnings in the entire experiment’
You will be individually called at the end of the experiment to be paid.
You will inform the experimenter about you ID number and you will be paid
accordingly.
Any questions?
Treatment 4: Compulsory delegation (CD)
Thanks for participating in the experiment!
Please remember that from this moment on and till the end of the exper-
iment no communication is permitted. If you have a question at any moment
please raise your hand and we will answer your question in private.
All identities in this experiment are anonymous. No one in the exper-
iment will get to know your identity during or after the experiment. Your
identity will only be used to ensure that you are paid correctly. Please read
the instructions with care. After reading them and before starting the game
we will provide each participant with a graphical example of the experiment.
You will be paid at the end of the experiment. During the experiment
we will use the term experimental money (EM) to refer to your earnings. At
the end of the experiment we will transform this amount in the local currency
using an exchange rate of 1. Notice that we will add 5 EM show up fee to
your experimental earnings. Your earnings are your private information.
Experiment:
The experiment has twelve periods. The structure of the experiment is
the following.
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There are three types of players in this experiment: player A, player B
and player C.
At the start of the experiment you will be assigned a personal identifica-
tion number by the computer. The computer will also inform you regarding
the type of player you have been chosen to be.
In each period, each player A is randomly paired with a player B. There
will also be two independent C players.
At the start of the period 10 EM will be assigned to each pairing (A-B).
We will now explain the structure of the game.
Each period:
Player A’s screen will show two boxes. Each box contains the ID’s of one
of the two players C. Player A needs to choose from one of the two players C
by clicking on the associated box. The chosen C will decide how to allocate
the 10 EM between players A and B.
The selected player C decides how to divide the 10 EM between each
pair of players A and B. The allocations can be made in increments of 1 cent.
The amount of 10 EM will be fully allocated between players A and B. That
is, the amount assigned to player B and player A always adds to 10 EM.
The allocation made by player C to a pair (A,B) is independent of the
allocation made to another pair (if player C has been chosen by more than
one player). If a player C has not been chosen by any player (A) then their
screen will show a waiting message.
Once players C have made their decisions, each player A and B will be
informed about the amount they have been assigned. In addition, all players
will see a table containing all the information regarding previous periods.
Payment:
Besides the 5 EM show up fees, each participant will be paid in the
following manner.
At the end of the experiment one of the periods will be randomly chosen
for each player A and B. Each player will be paid the amount they earned
for that period. That is, this will be the amount that was allocated to them
by player C in that period.
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At the start of the experiment each player C is given an additional
quantity of 5 EM However, player C loses 0.30 EM in each period and earns
0.15 EM for each player that selects him. Player C’s earnings are the total
sum of the earnings in the entire experiment.
You will be individually called at the end of the experiment to be paid.
You will inform the experimenter about you ID number and will be paid
accordingly.
Any questions?
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Chapter 5
Gender Biases in Endogenous
and Compulsory Delegation
Abstract
We explore gender differences in compulsory and endogenous delegation using
a modified dictator game. Under compulsory delegation principals of either
genders earn significantly more than in a dictator game as they select those
agents who share lower amounts with recipients. Male agents are the ones
allocating less to recipients and therefore the ones selected more frequently.
Under endogenous delegation principals earn similar amounts to principals
playing a standard dictator game. Independent of their gender, half the
principals decide to delegate. There are no significant differences between
male and female agents on amounts allocated to recipients.
Introduction
Delegation is an important tool to shape future hierarchical structures
of firms as successful agents will continue receiving responsibilities and will
potentially be promoted and occupy top positions in the structure. There-
fore gender biases in delegation and selection of agents may partially help to
explain why females are under-represented in competitive environments such
as labor markets where females reach top level positions less often than males
(Gregory-Smith et al. 2014; De Paola et al. 2016) and earn less than males
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with similar backgrounds and responsibilities (Booth et al., 2003; ; Kulich et
al. 2011).
We study gender differences under compulsory and endogenous delega-
tion using a modified dictator game (Hamman et al., 2010). We ask the
following questions: do male and female principals behave similarly when
they can delegate? Do different gender agents make the same allocation
decisions when delegation is compulsory and optional? And finally, who is
selected more often?
The only paper studying gender differences in delegation is Bottino et
al. (2016). They use a dictator game that requires delegating to a male or fe-
male agent and find no gender differences in principals earnings. In addition,
they find that male agents are selected more often as they reallocate lower
amounts than their female counterparts who are more concerned by equality
in distributions. This is specially true in later periods. In this chapter we
study whether gender differences are maintained under endogenous delega-
tion.
We study gender differences in compulsory and optional delegation us-
ing a modified dictator game (Hamman et al. 2010). The first treatment,
baseline, is a standard dictator game. The second treatment, endogenous
delegation allows the principal to delegate to the agent, one of which is a
male and the other a female. The selected agent or principal divides the
endowment. The last treatment is compulsory delegation. The principal has
to select one of the two available agents (a male and a female). The selected
agent will then decide how much to allocate to the recipient. The gender of
agents and principals is never known by the rest of the subjects.
Overall we find that, under compulsory or endogenous delegation, there
are no gender differences on principal’s average earnings. Differences, how-
ever, arise between agents. Male agents are selected more often when delega-
tion is compulsory as they share lower amounts with recipients (in line with
Bottino et al. 2016). In addition, male agents are selected even more often
by male than female principals. By contrast, under endogenous delegation
the amount of male and female agents selected is more homogeneous. Fe-
males are selected roughly more often. Finally, switching from one round to
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another happens more often when delegation is optional. Also male decision
makers switch less often in both treatments.
Literature review
Behavioural gender differences have been observed by many previous
studies. The literature review of Croson and Gneezy (2009) make clear
that there are gender differences in risk (Eckel and Grossman, 2008), social
(Eckel and Grossman, 1996a; Aguiar et al., 2009) and competition prefer-
ences (Gneezy et al., 2003; Nierdele and Vesterlund, 2007).
Previous literature in competition shows that females tend to underper-
form in competitive environments even when their abilities are similar to the
ones of males. Gneezy et al. (2003) ask participants to solve some puzzles
and observe that in the baseline treatment males and females solve similar
amount of puzzles, while under a competitive payment scheme male perfor-
mance improves while female performance remains constant.1 The tendency
of females to compete less is tested by Nierdele and Vesterlund (2007). They
show that when possible 73% of males choose to compete while only 35% of
females make the same choice.
Gender differences are also found in risk attitudes. Eckel and Grossman
(2008) review the experimental literature on risk and gender finding that
most studies find that females tend to be more risk averse than males.2
In dictator games (Forsythe et al. 1994) gender differences show mixed
results. Bolton and Katok (1995) find no gender differences in dictator’s
behavior when the gender of the recipient is unknown. By contrast, Eckel
and Grossman (1996a), conclude that all-female groups are more altruistic
1Gneezy et al. (2009) perform a field experiment on which they test competition in a
patriarchal and matrilineal society. They observe that females shy away from competition
in a patriarchal society like ours. This differences in competitive attitudes do not take
place in a matrilineal society.
2Booth and Nolen (2012) suggest that females are less risk averse when they are in all
female environments.
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than all-male groups when recipient’s gender is salient. Andreoni and Vester-
lund (2001) introduce a modified dictator game where prices and income are
different. They show that, when altruism is expensive, women share higher
amounts with recipients, but when it is cheap, men are more altruistic. Re-
garding subjects’ expectations Aguiar et al. (2009) show that women expect
women principals to be more generous while men do not predict any gender
differences in generosity.
Bottino et al. (2016) also use a modified dictator game to explore gen-
der biases in delegation and find that under compulsory delegation male and
female principals behave similarly and appoint the agent who gives less to
recipients. This results in both male and female principals delegating more
to male agents over time.3
In this paper we extend Hamman et al. (2010) and Bottino et al. (2016)
to investigate gender biases in endogenous delegation. The paper is organized
as follows. The experimental design is explained in section 3. The main re-
sults are discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes and discusses possible
extensions.
Experimental design
The experiment run to obtain the presented data is the same used in
chapter 4: “Distributional consequences of Endogenous and Compulsory Del-
egation”. The detailed experimental design can be found in Chapter 4.4
The important aspect that should be added is that in all the sessions of
CD and ED there were two agents, one male and one female. This informa-
tion was not salient and therefore participants were unaware of this.
Table 5.1 summarizes the experimental design and shows the number of
male (M) and female (F) principals and agents per treatment.
3For more details on the delegation literature go to Chapter 4.
4The instructions of this experiment can be found in the Appendix D of Chapter 4.
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Table 5.1: Summary of the experimental design
Baseline Endogenous Compulsory
Delegation Delegation
(BS) (ED) (CD)
Divides the endowment Principal Agent/Principal Agent
Sessions 4 17 5
Number of subjects 40 152 44
Principals 20 59 17
(10M/10F) (24M/35F) (7M/10F)
Agents - 34 10
(17M/17F) (5M/5F)
From previous literature (Hamman et al. 2010; Bottino et al. 2016) and
the specifications of our experimental design we will propose the following
hypotheses:
• Hypothesis 1: Principals of both genders will earn more in both dele-
gation treatments compared to the standard dictator game. We will not
find gender differences in principals earnings per treatment.
• Hypothesis 2: Male agents will be more successful in both delegation
treatments since they will be the ones reallocating lower amounts to
recipients.
Results
Hypothesis 1 predicts higher amounts earned by principals in both CD
and ED-D compared to BS and ED-N. We look at the average earnings of
male and female principals per treatment (Table 5.2) and find that principals
of both genders earn substantially more in CD than in any of the other treat-
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ments.5 Moreover, the differences in earnings of male and female principals
are only statistically different in the BS treatment where females earn more
than males (Mann-Whitney test6 ; z=-4.73, p=0.00).78
Table 5.2: Amounts earned by male and female principals by round
Earnings male Earnings female Total
principals principals earnings
BS 5.78 6.96 6.43
(0.19) (0.18) (0.14)
ED-D 6.35 6.01 6.17
(0.28) (0.22) (0.16)
ED-N 6.93 7 6.86
(0.25) (0.19) (0.15)
CD 7.13 7.67 7.44
(0.30) (0.26) (0.20)
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis
Result 1
• a: Principals of both genders earn more when delegation is compulsory.
5From now on when we present the average earnings of subjects we will not include the
£5 show up fee and the £2 for filling the questionnaires.
6From now on we use Mann-Whitney non-parametric tests to study the hypothesis that
two independent samples are from populations with the same distribution.
7Bottino et al. (2016), find no significant differences in principals earnings in BS, still
they find that males earn quantitatively less than females (males earn 7.53 and females
7.83).
8Using a Mann Whitney test to compare the distributions of male and female principals
earnings: CD (z=-1.41, p=0.16), ED-D (z=0.851, p=0.39), ED-N (z=0.345, p=0.73).
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• b: There are no gender differences in principals earnings in endoge-
nous or compulsory delegation, however, male principals earn less in a
standard dictator game
Hypothesis 2 predicts that males will allocate lower amounts when they
are selected as agents. In fact, in Table 5.3 we observe that male agents re-
allocate lower amounts to recipients in CD (z=6.22, p=0.00), but we do not
observe gender differences in agents behaviour in ED-D (z=1.12, p=0.26).9
Table 5.3: Amounts allocated by agents and principals (by treatment and
gender)
Male Female Male Female
principals principals agent agent
BS 4.21 3,03 —– —–
(0.18) (0.18)
ED-D —– —– 4.01 3.56
(0.32) (0.18)
ED-N 3.06 3.29 —– —–
(0.26) (0.21)
CD —– —– 1.64 3.83
(0.21) (0.31)
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis
Hypothesis 2 also predicts that male agents will be selected more often
as a result of them redistributing less in both delegation treatments. To
check if male agents are selected more often we analyse the amount of times
principals select male and female agents under CD and ED-D.
9See Figures 5.1 and 5.2 in Appendix A for a graphical comparison of the amounts
redistributed by each type of players in BS, CD and ED treatments.
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Figure 5.1 shows the proportion of principals choosing each genders’
agents by round in CD treatment. Under CD male agents allocate lower
amounts to recipients. As predicted by previous literature, male agents were
selected more often (61%) than female agents (39%) in CD. The tendency of
choosing more male agents is similar along all the periods.
Figure 5.1: Proportion of male and female agents selected by principals in
CD
Figure 5.2 illustrates the proportion of principals choosing not to dele-
gate in ED and the proportion of male and female agents selected by those
principals who chose to delegate. In this treatment male agents were not
allocating lower amounts than their female counterparts. As a consequence,
male agents are selected on average the 18% of the cases while females are
chosen on the 32%.
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Figure 5.2: Proportion of decisions made by principals and male and female
agents in ED
Agent selection by gender of the principal still results in male agents
being selected more often in CD by both male (69%) and female (59%) prin-
cipals. By contrast, in ED male principals delegate in male agents the 18% of
the decisions (male principals do not delegate in the 52% of the situations),
while female principals choose male agents in the 19% of the cases (and do
not delegate in the 49%). Hypothesis 2 does fulfils in CD but not in ED
where male agents are not selected more often.
To study the relationship between hiring an agent and the amounts al-
located by this agent we perform two OLS and probit regressions analysing
principals decisions (Table 5.4). Both OLS linear Models (1 and 2) have the
same dependent variable: the amount allocated to recipients. In Model 1
the data analysed is CD and the explanatory variable is the gender of the
agent making the decision on each round. Model 2 uses the ED data and the
explanatory variables are the gender of the decision maker (only when the se-
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lected decision maker is an agent) and the round. 10 Models 3 and 4 present
two probit models with the same dependent variable with value 1 if the prin-
cipal decides to switch the decision maker and 0 otherwise. In Model 3 the
data analysed is CD and in Model 4 ED. The independent variables in both
models are the gender of the decision maker (1 if is a male), the round and
the amount given in the round prior to deciding to switch the decision maker.
Table 5.4: Switching in round t based in round t-1
OLS Probit
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Gender of -2.03*** 0.52 -0.19** -0.30***
the decision (0.08) (0.35) (0.20) (0.10)
maker
Round -0.19*** 0.12*** 0.03 -0.01
(0.05) (0.02) (0.1) (0.03)
Amount given in —– —– 0.18*** 0.07***
previous rounds (0.03) (0.00)
Constant 4.90*** 4.39*** -0.96*** 0.05***
(0.44) (0.05) (0.27) (0.13)
Observations 187 323 187 649
(17) (59) (17) (59)
Log likelihood -99.46 -110.57 -395.88 -395.84
Prob > F 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
, where the number in parenthesis represent the standard errors for each
coefficient. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
10Round 12 is excluded from regression to avoid end game effect.
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In Model 1 the explanatory variable gender of the decision maker is neg-
ative and significant at a 1% level. This indicates that if the selected agent
is a male, the amount reallocated to the recipient will be lower in the CD
treatment. In addition, the coefficient associated to the variable round is also
significant and negative. Lower allocated amounts are expected as rounds
advance. In Model 2 the coefficient associated with the gender of the decision
maker (taking into account only selected agents) is not significant. Mean-
while, the coefficient associated to the round is significant, negative and has
a similar size as in Model 1. Therefore, in CD male agents reallocate lower
amounts to recipients across rounds. In ED we do not observe differences in
amounts shared by the agents gender.
In Model 3 we find that when the principal is a male the switching like-
lihood decreases in 0.19. This value is significant. The amount given in the
previous round has a positive and highly significant coefficient (0.18). The
round is not significant. In Model 4 the coefficient associated to the gender
of the decision maker is significant and negative (-0.30). If the principal is a
male less switching of decisions are predicted. The amount given in the pre-
vious round is significant and positive (0.07) and the round is not significant.
Therefore, principals switch more often when amounts reallocated are higher
in CD than in ED. Also, when the decision maker is a male the likelihood
of switching agents is lower in both ED and CD. Female principals switch
decision makers more in both treatments.
Following Bottino et al. (2016) we use panel data regression models to
analyse the selection process from agents perspective. We use a generalized
least squares regressions with cluster-robust standard errors estimation on
agents data.11 In both Models 5 (CD) and 6 (ED) the dependent variable is
the average allocation made by agents in a period. The set of independent
variables include the profit of the agent that period (the level of success of
the agent), the gender of the agent and the round they are in.
11The results are consistent using a clustered OLS estimation with robust standard
errors.
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Table 5.5: Agents
CD ED
Model 5 Model 6
Profit -4.15*** 0.17
(1.28) (0.48)
Male 2.24*** -0.03
(0.40) (0.32)
Round -0.05 -0.08**
(0.39) (0.44)
Constant 4.20*** 4.21***
(0.48) (0.32)
Observed principals 10 34
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.22
,where the number in parenthesis represent the standard errors for each
coefficient. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Model 5 indicates that in CD the profit made by agents and the agent
being a male considerably reduces the amounts allocated to recipients inde-
pendent of the round. This confirms that in CD male agents allocate lower
amounts to recipients and also that their success depends on lower amounts
redistributed. In Model 6 only the coefficient associated to the round is sig-
nificant and negative. Therefore in ED the level of success of the agent and
its gender do not affect the allocation decision made by the agent.
• Result 2: Male agents only redistribute lower amounts in CD, as a
result they are selected more often than females in this treatment. In
ED, male agents do not redistribute lower amounts and as a result, they
are not more successful than females.
Summing up, when delegation is compulsory principals earn more as
they select those agents who redistribute lower amounts to recipients, this
successful agents tend to be males. By contrast, when delegation is optional,
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amounts redistributed to recipients are higher and gender bias in agents se-
lection disappears.
Conclusion
We use a modified dictator game (Hamman et al. 2010) to explore gen-
der biases in compulsory and endogenous delegation. We find that male and
female principals earn similar amounts when they are in the same delegation
treatment (in line with Bottino et al. 2016). In addition, principals of both
genders earn significantly more when delegation is endogenous (and in the
standard dictator game) compared to forced delegation. This suggests that
there are no gender biases in the top level position where male and females
behave equally.
We also find that in compulsory delegation both female and male princi-
pals select the agent who shows less fairness concerns. The agent allocating
lower amounts to recipients is usually a male and therefore male agents are
selected more often. Therefore, compulsory delegation generates gender dis-
crimination in agents selection. This tendency to choose the agent who shares
less with recipients is weaker when delegation is optional. Consequently male
and female agents reallocate similar amounts to recipients as none of them is
competing through lower reallocated amounts. Endogenous delegation pre-
vents gender discrimination in the selection of agents.
Male agents success in compulsory delegation could be linked to male
agents being more efficient in competitive environments (Gneezy et al., 2003;
Nierdele and Vesterlund, 2007). In compulsory delegation the relationship
between allocating lower amounts and being selected more often is clear for
agents while in endogenous delegation the best way to compete is not so
clear.12
12When delegation is optional agents seem to stop competing by giving lower amounts to
recipients as they did in compulsory delegation. This difference is not driven by informa-
tional differences between treatments as we run an extra endogenous delegation treatment
that was informationally closer to compulsory delegation, by not mentioning the alterna-
tive to delegating. This extra treatment gives us exactly the same results as the original
endogenous delegation treatment.
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Another explanation could be in Gino et al. (2015) who find that men
and women view professional advancement differently. Women valuae high
level positions less as they see more negative aspects associated with them.
Delegation is a tool to shape the future hierarchical structure of organiza-
tions. Agents who perform well when delegated will continue receiving more
responsibilities and ascending. Therefore, following the findings of Gino et
al. (2015) women agents have different objectives than male agents who val-
uate more being selected by principals and therefore are willing to allocate
lower amounts to recipients. Females on the other hand are less concerned
with being selected more often (and ascending) and more concerned about
fairness in the redistribution of the endowment.
Concerning future research, the dictator game is a very specific environ-
ment and it would be worth extending this analysis to other types of settings
(i.e. a setting involving effort from participants or team work) and games
(i.e. ultimatum game). Such contexts could help to understand better the
relationship between delegation and gender differences.
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Appendix A
Table 5.1: Answers to the questionnaire
BS CD ED
Player P R P R A P R A
I feel 1.85 -0.78 0.17 -0.82 0.88 1.30 -0.43 -0.27
involved (1.55M (-1.11M/ (-0.6M/ (-0.1M/ (1.6M (1.3M/ (-0.3M/ (-0.2M/
in the ex- /2F) /1.3F) /0.6F) /-1.6F) /1.3F) -0.8F) 0.5F)
periment
Profit 1.11 0.68 1.57 0.05 0 1.22 0.91 0.03
was (1.7M/ (1.2M/ (2M/ (0.3M/ (0.8M/ (1.4M/ (0.4M/ (0.3M/
relevant /1.3F) /0.2F /1.2F) /0.2F) /1.2F) /0.1F) /0.3F)
I consider my 2.25 2.68 2.64 1.82 2.87 1.66 2.32 1.64
behaviour (2.1M (2.4M/ (2.7M/ (2M/ (2.8M (1.5M/ (2.22M/ (1.55M/
acceptable /2.3F) 2.9F) 2.6F) 1.6F) 2.8F) 1.7F) 2.1F) /1.7F)
Players P
had an —- 0.10 — -0.23 0.70 — 0.56 0.44
acceptable (-0.3M/ (-0.3M/ (1.2M/ (0.5M/ (0.3M/
behaviour /0.5F) /-0.1F) 0.2F) /0.5F /0.5F)
Players A
had an —- — 1.86 — — 1.05 — —
acceptable (1.8M/ (0.7M/
behaviour /1.1F) /1.1F)
I am ready 1.46 1.73 1.94 1.76 2.30 1.35 1.89 1.87
to take (1M/ (1.6M/ (2.1M (1.7M/ (2.2M/ (1.3M/ (1.8M (1.9M
risks /1.7F) 1.8F) /1.8F) 1.8F) 2.4F) 1.3F) /1.8F) /1.7F)
Note: Average values of the answers to a seven item scale questionnaire, form strongly disagree (-3) to
strongly agree (+3) with a neutral option (0). Average values for males (M) and females (F) in
parenthesis.
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Figure 5.1: Amounts allocated to recipients by male and female principals in
BS and ED-N
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Figure 5.2: Amounts allocated to recipients by male and female agents in
CD and ED-D
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